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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20060627-SC
vs.
WANDA EILEEN BARZEE,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State's "failure to marshal" argument is without merit as it fails to cite any
facts not marshaled.
The State has also failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
forcible medication is substantially likely to further the State's interest in this case. Many
of the facts the State cites in support of its claim that competency restoration is
substantially likely while adverse side effects are substantially unlikely, are irrelevant and
misleading. The State's legal analysis similarly misconstrues the cases it relies upon,
which cases are mostly irrelevant to Ms. Barzee.
The State also fails to meet its burden under the additional Sell* factors. In its

]

Sellv. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed. 2d 297 (2003).

analysis of the State's interest in prosecuting Ms. Barzee and contrary to the undisputed
evidence on record, the State erroneously assumes that Ms. Barzee is a danger to herself
or to others outside the confines of the state hospital. Also, the State presents insufficient
evidence to make any conclusion about the likelihood of Ms. Barzee's long-term
commitment to a mental health facility, as the trial court noted in its ruling. The State
fails to establish by clear and convincing evidence that its interest outweighs Ms.
Barzee's liberty interest.
Similarly, the State fails to establish by clear and convincing evidence that there
are no less intrusive alternatives to forcible medication, or that it is medically appropriate
in Ms. Barzee's case.
Finally, the State's cursory assertion that Ms. Barzee's state constitutional law
claim is inadequately briefed is insufficient to rebut Ms. Barzee's argument and analysis
on that point, and should therefore be disregarded.
ARGUMENT
L

THE STATE'S "FAILURE TO MARSHAL" ARGUMENT IS WITHOUT
MERIT AND SHOULD BE SUMMARILY DISREGARDED.
The State generally asserts throughout its brief that Ms. Barzee has failed to

marshal the evidence. This claim is without merit. The State's sweeping assertions of
Ms. Barzee's purported failure to marshal are inaccurate, particularly when it fails to cite
any unmarshaled facts. See, e.g., BRIEF OF APPELLEE ("Br. Appe.") at 29 ("A
comparison of the parties' factual summaries quickly establishes defendant's marshaling
2

failures regarding Drs. Jeppson's and Whitehead's testimony" (citing pages in both
parties' briefs, without more)); see also, id. at 35 (asserting, "The marshaled facts negate
defendant's claim", without citing any facts not marshaled). The State fails to point to
any specific facts not marshaled and further seems to suggest that Ms. Barzee can only
meet a marshaling requirement, if any applies, if she skews the facts in the State's favor
and thereby makes the State's argument for it. Id. at 37.2
Moreover, given Ms. Barzee's lengthy and detailed Statement of Facts set forth
in her opening brief and created with the marshaling requirement in mind, and as
demonstrated by the State's unsupported assertions, the State is hard pressed to find even
an obscure fact not marshaled. As a comparison between the record, the parties' briefs
and their respective recitations of the facts demonstrates, the only thing Ms. Barzee's
opening brief is lacking is the State's argument and its concomitant version of the facts.
The State's "failure to marshal" argument is not only improper, but is so lacking
in merit that it serves only to diminish the State's credibility. Accordingly, the State's

2

The State argues, "Again, defendant fails to properly marshal the facts. When
marshaled, the evidence supports the court's assessments." Then in the following
paragraph the State recounts some of the trial court's findings and the testimonies of Drs.
Jeppson and Whitehead, all of which are in fact marshaled in Ms. Barzee's opening brief,
in addition to other relevant facts not acknowledged by the State. See, e.g., BRIEF OF
APPELLANT ("Br. Appt"), at 15-16, 27, 36-37. This pattern of one-sided and
unsupported assertions is followed throughout the State's brief. However, unlike Ms.
Barzee who has assumed the significant marshaling burden applies, the State tends to
ignore those facts unfavorable to its position, thereby facilitating the State's ability to
create a one-sided and thus inaccurate view of the evidence in this case.
3

claim that Ms. Barzee failed to marshal the evidence should be summarily disregarded.
II.

THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO ESTABLISH A SUBSTANTIAL
LIKELIHOOD OF MS. BARZEE BEING RESTORED TO
COMPETENCY THROUGH FORCED MEDICATION, OR A
SUBSTANTIAL UNLIKELIHOOD OF ADVERSE SIDE EFFECTS.
The State's burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that

involuntary medication is substantially likely to further the State's interest in this case is
certainly formidable. The law and the evidence the State cites in its efforts to meet that
burden is sometimes irrelevant and mischaracterized, and in some cases actually supports
Ms. Barzee's position. While the evidence is lengthy and detailed, the legal and factual
analysis is not complicated.
A.

THE STATE'S FACTUAL ANALYSIS IS MISLEADING.

The trial court deferred to Dr. Jeppson in granting the State's motion to compel
medication. R557-58. Therefore, the analysis hinges really upon one question: Did the
State establish by clear and convincing evidence that Dr. Jeppson's inexpert but
"hopeful" "wait and see" (R579:14, 18-20, 30-1, 45) approach is substantially likely to
render Ms. Barzee competent, and substantially unlikely to result in side effects impairing
her ability to consult with her attorneys? See, United States v. Dallas, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 81162 (D. Neb. May 11, 2006) (rejecting a similarly vague treatment regimen as
insufficient under Sell to establish a substantial likelihood of competency restoration).
In other words, is "practicing [] an N of 1" and "see[ing] if she responds or not"
(R579:45) clear and convincing evidence of & substantial likelihood that Dr. Jeppson's
4

approach will not just be beneficial, but will actually restore Ms. Barzee to competency?
It is not, and the State cannot meet its burden on these facts. Accordingly, the State seeks
to avoid this problem with its own evidence by focusing on facts that are irrelevant or
misleading.
For example, the State claims in its Statement of Facts that Dr. Jeppson
experienced a 70-80 percent success rate in restoring "his psychotic delusional patients"
to competency. Br. Appe. at 14.3 This mischaracterizes Dr. Jeppson's testimony. He
opined that there was a 70-80 percent restoration rate among general populations of
patients at the federal hospital in St. Louis and "some of the other districts have reported
70 percent

[W]e have those kinds of numbers at our hospital." R579:32. Dr. Jeppson

also testified that this rate was equivalent to the rate of restoration in patients suffering
from psychotic disorder NOS, his newly derived diagnosis of Ms. Barzee. Id. Dr.

3

In a footnote, the State argues, "Contrary to defendant's suggestion that [Dr.
Jeppson's] death impacts the trial court's ruling, it was known prior to the medication
hearing that the doctor was seriously ill, yet defendant never claimed the court should
consider this fact in ruling" (citations omitted). This argument is both inappropriate,
because it is not supported by the record, and untrue. The defense was never apprised by
the State of Dr. Jeppson's illness and was shocked to learn of his death from the obituary
section of a local newspaper, coincidentally on the same day the trial court issued its
ruling in this case. The State's suggestion that the defense had an obligation to raise the
possibility of Dr. Jeppson's death in the trial court is also either disingenuous or reflects a
lack of understanding. Although the trial court improperly made Dr. Jeppson's death
relevant when it deferred solely to him because of his supposed familiarity with Ms.
Barzee rather than pointing to objective facts supporting a substantial likelihood of
competency restoration (R558-59), neither Dr. Jeppson's purported familiarity nor his
untimely death are relevant under Sell. Therefore, it would have been improper for the
defense to ask the court to consider the impact of Dr. Jeppson's pending death.
5

Jeppson said nothing about "his" "psychotic delusional patients." Br. Appe. at 14.
The State also suggests it is significant that Dr. Raphael Morris did not read all of
Ms. Barzee's hospital records. Br. Appe. at 18, 38.4 If this is significant, then it should
also be noted that neither Dr. Jeppson nor Dr. Whitehead testified that they had read all of
Ms. Barzee's hospital records. R579. It is not even clear what Ms. Barzee's "full hospital
file" (Br. Appe. at 18) is comprised of, much less that her treating physician reviewed it in
its entirety. However, this is a non-issue and irrelevant to Dr. Morris' credibility and
expertise. He was retained as an expert on the efficacy of antipsychotic medications on
someone exhibiting Ms. Barzee's undisputed symptoms and history as reported by other
experts. His incidental meeting with Ms. Barzee prior to the evidentiary hearing was
merely fortuitous but not necessary. Nonetheless, as a result of that meeting, Dr. Morris
has had as much contact with Ms. Barzee as Dr. Whitehead has. R579:59-60, 101.
The State further quotes Dr. Xavier Amador's testimony that if there was only a 5
percent chance of competency restoration, he would "do everything in [his] power to
convince a patient to take medication . . . Untreated psychosis is a bad thing." Br. Appe. at
24; R579:186. This testimony is irrelevant to the second prong of Sell. The fact that every
doctor who testified, and presumably any doctor, would treat a patient if there was even a

4

The State also implies that Dr. Amador did not read Ms. Barzee's medical
records. Br. Appe. at 38. There is no evidence to suggest Dr. Amador did not read Ms.
Barzee's full file. Moreover, he testified that prior to one of his interviews with Ms.
Barzee, he "had reviewed a substantial number of hospital records already." R579:182.
6

slim hope of some beneficial effect, has no bearing on the question of whether such
treatment is substantially likely to result in competency restoration. It is certainly not clear
and convincing evidence/ Moi eo v ei , beneficial effect, eithei ph.;; - sical 01 psychological,
(Joes i lot equate to competency restoration, yet the State seems to suggest they are one and
the same.
The State's additional claim that "All the doctors. . . agree that unless defendant
is medicated, she will remain incompetent1 ' (Br. Appe at 26), is also a mischaracterization,
at least b> omissic n ' I he State's later assei tion that Di • \ mador

••''•*-

: y

medication could possibly accomplish" (Br. Appe. at 42) competency restoration is
similarly a misstatement of the evidence, as can be observed by reviewing the record cited
by the State (R579:166-6' 7, 1' 75 76, 18' 7, 191) (Addendum A). Neither Di !\ lorris noi Dr

the State omits mentioning that neither doctor believes Ms. Barzee will be restored to
competency via medication or any other means. R579:107-08, 115- 16, 117-18, 122, 123,
128, I y

. • 160-61, 162, 163-64, 166-69, 1 ; 1- 1 6, 1 7 ; , 191

5

'

1 he State makes a puzzling conclusion in its footnote 13 (Br. Appe. at 25). It
compares Ms. Barzee's purported reluctant willingness to take medication solely to please
hospital staff to Dr. Amador's proposed use of persuasive therapy to convince her it is in
her best interest to do so. The State concludes, "Unlike Dr. Amador, Dr. Whitehead did
not view this as consent." (Citations omitted). Notwithstanding the fact that these two
situations are hardly similar, the State's conclusion is completely irrelevant.
7

Amador would treat her with medication. Br. Appe. at 39. However, notwithstanding the
fact that Ms. Barzee did not ignore the substance of her own experts' testimony in this
context (see, Br. Appt. at 22, 26), it is completely irrelevant to the question of whether
there is a substantial likelihood that forcible medication will render Ms. Barzee competent.
Similarly, the State's claim that Ms. Barzee ignored the "salient" fact that "no
expert claimed that the anticipated side effects would significantly interfere with her
ability to consult with her attorneys" (Br. Appe. at 39) evades the State's high burden to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that such interfering side effects are
substantially unlikely. It also ignores Dr. Amador's singularly expert testimony that
forcible medication would likely result in traumatic side effects of a nature that would
presumably interfere with Ms. Barzee's ability to consult with counsel. R579:187, 19093. General assertions by the State's witnesses that serious side effects are rare and Ms.
Barzee would be monitored for the same (R579:21,46-8, 5:5-6, 65-6, 199-200) are
insufficient. Even the State acknowledges that the medications proposed in this case are a
"new generation" (Br. Appe. at 40), and as is the nature of all newer drugs, side effects are
emerging and thus not all known at this early stage.
The State further notes, "[Defendant argues why the trial court could have
accorded more weight to the defense opinions, but does not establish why the court's
failure to do so is clear error." Br. Appe. at 29 (emphasis in original). Ms. Barzee has
never taken the position that the trial could have ruled in her favor; rather, her position is

8

that the trial court should have done so because the clear weight of the evidence is
overwhelmingly in her favor. Bi Appt. 29-50. I lie trial court ignored the scientific

entire case who admitted he was not an expert; and as the primary physician charged with
the responsibility of restoring Ms. Barzee to competency; he had what he apparently
construed as a professional stake in persuading the trial court to compel medication.

prove by clear and convincing evidence a substantial likelihood of restoration.6
The State fails to disclose other facts unfavorable to its position. Noting that
delusional disorder is rare, the State claims that only Dr. Amador reached that diagnosis.

Barzee's case, and more importantly, the fact that all experts have agreed that her
delusional symptoms are most prominent and have remained constant.7 See, e.g., R336-

6

The State attempts to bolster its evidence and the tiiai cuiui & lining oy assei u:\^,
without any citation to the record, that "the trial court observed and interacted with
defendant during numerous court proceedings over two years." Br. Appe. at 34. Not only
is this statement not supported by the record and therefore inappropriate, but there is no
aspect of the ruling that even suggests the court employed any such considerations.
7

The State notes Dr. Amador had not seen Ms. Barzee for about a year prior to the
hearing (Br. Appe. at 38), but fails to explain why this is significant, particularly when
none of her symptoms had changed and the hospital treatment team had also not seen her
for about the same amount of time. R579:18. Also, Dr. Jeppson left on medical leave for
two and a half months shortly after the State filed its motion during the Fall of 2005, and
there is no evidence to suggest that the duration or quality of his contact with Ms. Barzee
exceeded or even met that of Dr. Amador R ^7Q* 1 °
9

37; R577:19-20, 25, 33, 37-8, 47, 52, 55, 72-3; R578:10-l 1, 14-16, 18,23; R579:12,1415, 18-19,41-2, 77-8, 103, 118,130,154, 165, 167-69, 171-73, 191, 193-94.
Drs. Cohn and Kovnick initially reached separate diagnoses of schizophrenia and
shared psychotic delusional disorder, respectively, while noting that Ms. Barzee suffers
from delusions. R336-37. Dr. Berge agreed with Dr. Kovnick in reaching his diagnosis of
shared psychotic delusional disorder but stated he would change the diagnosis to
delusional disorder if Ms. Barzee's delusions continued after her separation from the codefendant, which they have. R577:19-20, 52. In the meantime, Dr. Jeppson, Ms. Barzee's
"default" treating physician, also diagnosed her with delusional disorder. R579:12.
Although Ms. Barzee's delusions continued, coinciding with the hospital's and
the State's efforts to force medicate Ms. Barzee and in anticipation of a Sell hearing, Dr.
Jeppson for the first time changed to the "working" and less specific diagnosis of
psychotic disorder NOS. R579:12, 33, 38-41. Dr. Nielson concurrently reached the same
diagnosis. R578:10-12, 19-20. The State has little to no response to the fact that both Dr.
Morris and Dr. Amador, who are irrefutably the most highly qualified experts on the
subject, pointed out that a diagnosis of psychotic disorder NOS is based on a lack of
information, and is therefore questionable after the hospital has had two years to observe
Ms. Barzee and thereby reach a narrower diagnosis. R579:128-29, 132-33, 154-55. And
contrary to the State's representation of the facts (Br. Appe. at 35), although he had
formed an informal opinion, Dr. Morris did not make a formal diagnosis of Ms. Barzee

10

and was not retained to do so. R 579:130.
Finally, Dr. Amador, presumably the final word on the subject since he actually

upon in reaching their diagnoses, concluded that Ms. Barzee suffers from delusional
disorder. R579:152, 154, 164. Notably, the State fails to acknowledge that Dr. Amador
reached this diagnosis from the beginning of his contact with Ms. Barzee two years prior

On a related note, the State claims, "While the state doctors opined that labels
were less important than symptoms, Drs. Amador and Morris admitted that even if her
symptoms did not change, what label attached would change their restoration projections
(R57 9:1 28, 166 6 ; , 1: ; 5 76, 186)." Bi - i|: >] >e.at36 Ihis i: ;notti ue. \ i e\ iew < i f 1 he
State's citations tc • the record is ilh lminating and are inch ide d in Addendum A,.
On page 128 of the transcript, consistent with the testimony of some of the
State's experts, Dr. Morris discusses how diagnosis impacts the likelihood of restoration.
Nowhere does he claim that prognosis is not impacted by symptoms. I o the contrary, i •> n.

Ms. Barzee's symptoms in forming their diagnoses and conclusions. R579:102-04, 10708, 115-18, 122-23, 128, 132-33, 137, 145, 154-55, 162-64, 165-67, 171 77, 19394
Further on pages 166-6 7, Dr. Amador explains ; - unlikelihood of competency

11

psychosis, and "the primary competency impairing symptom of grandiose delusions"
(R579:166). On pages 175-76, Dr. Amador discusses the negative impact of Ms. Barzee's
lack of insight (i.e., anosygnosia, a symptom of delusional disorder) on her prognosis for
restoration to competency. He also explains if Ms. Barzee suffered from schizophrenia or
psychotic disorder NOS, although anosygnosia would still negatively impact prognosis,
Ms. Barzee's chances for restoration would be slightly higher. Finally, on page 186, Dr.
Amador explains that he would do everything in his power to treat a psychotically ill
patient even if there was only a 5 percent chance of beneficial effect. A specific diagnosis
is not even mentioned.
Based on the foregoing, the State's characterization of this cited testimony as an
admission that Drs. Morris and Amador would not change their prognosis for restoration
even if Ms. Barzee's symptoms were to change, is misleading. Their respective
testimonies are all about how Ms. Barzee's symptoms negatively impact her prognosis.
The State also cites pages 311, 328 and 343 of the DSMV-IV8 as supporting
authority for the State's claim that "a [psychotic disorder NOS] diagnosis remains valid as
long as symptoms of two or more psychoses exists." Br. Appe. at 36 and its Addendum E?
The citations given do not support the State's conclusion. Page 311 is missing from Ms.
Barzee's copies of the State's brief. Page 328 states:
^Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition.
9

The State's reliance on the DSMV-IV seems ironic given that Dr. Jeppson, the
doctor deferred to by the trial court, does not rely upon it much. R579:31, 35, 54.
12

A diagnosis of Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified may be made if
insufficient information is available to choose between Delusional Disorder and
other Psychotic Disorders or to determine whether the presenting symptoms are
substance induced or the result of a general medical condition.
(Bold in 01 iginal; emphasis added) Page 343 states inpei tii le nt j: ai t:
This category [of psychotic disorder NOS] includes psychotic symptomatology
(i.e., delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, grossly disorganized i
catatonic behavior) about which there is inadequate information to nu;l-. ./
specific diagnosis or about which there is contradictory information, or disorders
with psychotic symptoms that do not meet the criteria for any specific Psychotic
'• • Disorder, •
(Emphasis added) (Bi \ ppe. Addendum. E).
There is nothing in this language to suggest that a diagnosis of psychotic disorder
NOS "remains valid as long as symptoms of two or more psychoses exists." Bi \ppc tt
36 R ather, it is consistent \v ith both Di I lords' and Dr. Amador's testimony that it is
geiiei all) a temporary diagnosis based i lpon a lack of infoi i

,y

-29,

132-33, 154-56), and is therefore not appropriate after two years of observation and after
Ms. Barzee has already been diagnosed several times with more narrow diagnoses.
Moreover, Dr. Jeppson's stated reason foi changing the diagnosis from the

he admitted Ms. Barzee had exhibited when he first diagnosed her with delusional disorder
(R579:12, 22, 41), and which he characterized as atypical of that diagnosis.10 R579:33.

10

Dr. Whitehead did not diagnose Ms. Barzee. However, while he found the
"broad umbrella" diagnosis of psychotic disorder NOS reasonable given the "limitations
of assessment", he agreed that a diagnosis of delusional disorder is also reasonable.
13

However, the DSMV-IV specifically notes that this type of thinking is in fact symptomatic
of delusional disorder:
Ideas of reference (e.g., that random events are of special significance) are
common in individuals with this [delusional] disorder. Their interpretation of
these events is usually consistent with the content of their delusional beliefs.
Br. Appe. Addendum E at 325-26.
Even to a layman, Ms. Barzee's belief that God gives her messages through
movies is consistent with the content of her grandiose religious delusions that she is the
mother of Zion and a prophet. That Dr. Jeppson was unaware that this behavior is
symptomatic of delusional disorder may be attributed to his status as a "clinician" rather
than as an expert, he did not "pack around" the diagnostic manual relied upon by
professionals in his field, nor had he read it recently. R579:31, 35, 54.
The State's desired interpretation of the facts in this case does not change them.
Nor do the irrelevant facts cited help the State in meeting its significant burden in
establishing a substantial likelihood of restoration via involuntary medication. Also, the
State hardly mentions the likelihood or the possible impact of side effects, other than to
mention that Drs. Jeppson, Whitehead, and Morris testified such effects are mostly mild
and those considered more serious are controllable. Br. Appe. at 34.
While this characterization of the evidence misconstrues Dr. Morris' testimony

R579:61-2, 76-8. However, Dr. Whitehead is the only expert who believes Ms. Barzee's
diagnosis is irrelevant to her prognosis. R579:62, 80.
14

that the risks associated with medication outweigh the benefits in this case (R579:123-26),
it also ignores two important facts that defeat the State's ability to meet its burden: (1) Drs.
Jeppson and Wl litel lead lacked the i eqi lisite expertise to accoi iiit foi Ms. Barzee's •
characteristics, symptoms, and history in reaching their general conclusions; and (2) Di
Amador, who indisputably has the requisite knowledge and expertise to testify regarding
the traumatic side effects observed in patients similar to Ms. Barzee, testified that such
,•

. ii

;

The v ;•

"his testimony was not refuted.
'• .

^tablish i cleai and con1' < incing e v idence a substantial

likelihood that involuntary medication will restore Ms. Barzee to competency, or a
substantial unlikelihood of side effects interfering with her ability to consult with counsel.
. B.

THE STATU "S LEGAL ANALYSIS IS ALSO

1 N C 0 R R E C T

I n ;ul<ii1ion to (lithi luiKl.'tmnilal pioblrnis w ilh llir Stale's version ol I lie facts,
supra, the State's legal analysis is similarly flawed. The State cites several cases in
support of its claim that forcible medication is substantially likely to render Ms. Barzee
competent

V ieview of that analysis demonstrates that the State's reliance upon these

.YtMN ,. both misplaced and m isleading

-

• •'..' • • '

•

' • /•

The State cites United States v. Weston11 in support of its claim that forcible
medication is substantially likely to render Ms. Barzee competent and substantially

]1

255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir 2001), cert denied, 534 U.S. 106" (2001) (Addendum

15

unlikely to result in adverse side effects. Br. Appe. at 31, 38, 40. However, Weston is
largely irrelevant because it predates Sell and does not address whether medication was
likely to restore competency in that case. Further, Weston was schizophrenic and a danger
to himself and others such that the court found that his "liberty interest" "gives way when
medication is essential to mitigate the detainee's dangerousness." Id. at 874-75, 876-78.
See also, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (allowing involuntary medication if
a detainee is a danger to himself and treatment is in his best medical interest). Therefore,
the court in Weston only considered the question of involuntary medication in the Harper
context of whether it was medically appropriate and "necessary to accomplish an essential
state policy" {Id. at 887). The question of the likelihood of restoration was not at issue.
Therefore, Weston has no relevance to the question of whether forcible medication is
substantially likely to render Ms. Barzee competent.
The State also places great weight on the vaguely referenced (R579:32) USMC
statistics of a 70-80 percent restoration rate among general populations of psychotic
patients. The State cites a number of mostly obscure cases as support for its claim that
"other courts have accepted the validity of [general statistics from the U.S. Medical
Centers in Springfield and Butner] in ordering involuntary medication of psychotic
patients." Br. Appe. at 38. This claim is not true.
In United States v. Morris, 2005 WL 348306, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38791 (D.
Del. Feb. 8, 2005) (Br. Appe. Addendum G), the court did not rely upon the USMC

16

statistics in reaching its determination that involuntary medication was substantially likely
to render Morris competent. Indeed, there is no analysis on that point whatsoever, as the
decision is substantively an order compelling medication and the court merely concludes
that the government met its burden. Id.
The State similarly misconstrues the additional cases it cites. Br. Appe. 38-9.
See, United States v. Archuleta, 2006 WL 2476070, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63526 (D.
Utah Aug. 24, 2006) (Br. Appe. Addendum G) (same); United States v. Ballestros, 2006
WL 224437, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6011 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2006) (Br. Appe. Addendum
G) (no mention of USMC studies and court merely concludes based on expert's testimony
outlining treatment regimen that restoration of competency is substantially likely); United
States v. Martin, 2005 WL 1895110, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16477 (W.D. Va. Aug. 10,
2005) (Br. Appe. Addendum G) (the court relies solely on the forensic report, not any
statistics, and the decision is devoid of any legal analysis on the likelihood of competency
restoration and the unlikelihood of side effects); United States v. Kimball, 2004 WL
3105948, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26586 (N.D. Iowa March 23,2004 (same12; Br. Appe.
Addendum G). The most that can be said about these cases is that the defendants were

12

The extent of the court's analysis is as follows: "Dr. Evans . . . opined that
psychotropic medication is the treatment of choice for the defendant to restore her to
competency. [He] further opined that there is a substantial probability that such treatment
will result in the restoration of defendant's competence. Dr. Pederson likewise opined
that the only course of treatment likely to effectively treat the defendant's condition is
antipsychotic medication. The court thus finds that the administration of medication is
substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial."
17

treated at USMCs, which is no surprise since these are all federal cases.13
The State's reliance on United States v. Evans, All F. Supp. 2d 696 (U.S. Dist.
Ct. W. Va. 2006) (Addendum C) is similarly misplaced. Evans was diagnosed with
paranoid schizophrenia and the empirical studies relied upon in predicting his restorability
via medication "indicated] a substantial success rate .. .for patients like Evans" Id.
(emphasis added).14 Similarly, in United States v. Algere, 396 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. La.
2005) (Addendum D), the government's experts opined "a 70-80% success rate of
restoring" all patients, many of them schizophrenic as was Algere, and further cited a
separate empirical study demonstrating an 87 percent restoration rate in a group of
patients, "most of whom were schizophrenic" as well as studies cited in a practice
guideline published by the American Psychiatric Association relevant to Algere's
symptoms and diagnosis. Id. at 742.
13

The State implies that medication will be successful in Ms. Barzee's case when it
cites United States v. Ghane, 2006 WL 3160691, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79421 (W.D.
Mo. July 12, 2006) (Br. Appe. Addendum G), noting that Ghane became competent when
he took medication, "but when his medication was stopped, again lost his competency."
Br. Appe. at 33, n. 15. However, a review of the order in Ghane evidences that
medication was not effective and caused negative side effects. Although Ghane took
medication voluntarily, "his perception of events around him is still filtered through his
delusions and negatively impacts his ability . . . to participate meaningfully in his own
defense." Id.
14

The State claims Ms. Barzee "does not acknowledge that after Evans' case was
remanded, additional evidence, similar to the evidence presented in this case, was
presented and involuntary medication order." Br. Appe. 39. This is inaccurate. The
Evans court found persuasive various studies finding an 80 percent restoration in cases
similar to Evans' and Evans' prior history of responding positively to medication. Id. at
703-04.
18

Finally, in United States v. Bradley, All F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2005) (Addendum
E), which is also cited by the State, again there is no mention of the USMC studies and the
testifying expert merely outlined his proposed treatment regimen. Id. atl 115. Moreover,
the Bradley court noted that the "record admits of little challenge to the proposition that
administration of antipsychotic drugs would substantially aid Bradley's return to
competency. We conclude the Government met its burden . . . " Id}5
The State's claim that all of the foregoing cases "accepted the validity" of the
general restoration rates reported by the USMC in determining a substantial likelihood of
restoration is inaccurate. Most cases merely provide bare conclusions and/or orders with
no factual analysis, and those that do provide any analysis are irrelevant to Ms. Barzee's
case. They have no similarity to her history or symptomology. Therefore, the State's
reliance on these cases to support its claim that Ms. Barzee is substantially likely to be
rendered competent via forcible administration of medication is disingenuous.
In asserting that the prognosis for competency restoration can be extrapolated
from general restoration rates and applied to a specific patient, the State ignores the
testimony of one of its own experts, Dr. Paul Whitehead. In discussing the fact that 15 out
of 15 patients suffering from psychotic disorder NOS were restored to competency at the
Utah State Hospital, Dr. Whitehead cautioned:

15

The Bradley court also conducted a detailed analysis of the potential side effects,
which analysis would not be possible here, based on obviously more extensive evidence
presented in Bradley that was absent in this case. Id. at 743-44.
19

All 15 were restored, but I wouldn't extrapolate that to mean that there is a 100percent chance someone with that diagnosis would be restored. I don't do
statistics on these types of numbers because it is not research, and research is
difficult to do with people who are . . . in a hospital against their will".
R579:63.
The law cited by the State does not support the trial court's findings and
conclusions or a substantial likelihood of restoration in Ms. Barzee's case.
III.

THE STATE FAILS TO MEET ITS BURDEN UNDER THE REMAINING
SELL FACTORS.
A.

THE STATE HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE AN IMPORTANT
INTEREST OVERRIDING MS. BARZEE'S LIBERTY.16

Ms. Barzee has already conceded that the serious nature of the crimes alleged in
this case weigh in the State's favor. Br. Appt. at 42. Delay and concomitant fair trial
concerns are an issue in every case. However, any remaining considerations under this
factor are in Ms. Barzee's favor and outweigh the State's interest. In any event, the State
has not otherwise established the contrary by clear and convincing evidence.
First, the State is mistaken in claiming that "the parties disagree on defendant's
inherent dangerousness to herself or others outside the limited confines of the state

16

In claiming the State must demonstrate an interest overriding Ms. Barzee's
liberty, the State accuses Ms. Barzee of mischaracterizing the proper standard, "which
requires clear and convincing evidence that important state interests are at stake in
restoring defendant's competency." Br. Appe. at 30 (citation and punctuation omitted).
This is a distinction without a difference. See, e.g., United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d at
879 (explaining the required showing that "other govemraent interests override a pretrial
detainee's liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic medication."
20

hospital." Br. Appe. at 31. Not only is this assertion unsupported by any citation to the
record, but the record establishes that all experts, including the State's experts, agree that
Ms. Barzee is not a danger to herself or to others in any setting. R579:16-17, 19-21, 27,
52, 60. Second, the State's evidence leaves the question of Ms. Barzee's continued
commitment to a mental health facility unanswered.
It is not Ms. Barzee's position only that the trial court "should have considered
other 'special circumstances' unique" (Br. Appe. at 32) to Ms. Barzee's case. In addition,
it is Ms. Barzee's position that the State failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that its interest in bringing Ms. Barzee to trial outweighs her liberty interest to
refuse antipsychotic medications. Given the State's failure to meet this burden and its
reliance upon the incorrect assumption that any expert in this case has found Ms. Barzee to
be a danger to anyone, the State has failed to meet its burden under this prong.
B.

THE STATE FAILS TO SHOW THAT FORCIBLE MEDICATION
IS NECESSARY.

The crux of the State's argument on this point is that "no evidence exists that
alternate, less intrusive means than involuntary medication are likely to restore [Ms.
Barzee's] competency." Br. Appe. at 41. Then again and without citing the record, the
State erroneously claims that "[e]very doctor who examined defendant opined that only
medication can restore her competency." Id. and at 42. This claim misconstrues the
evidence in this case. See, argument and citations to the record, supra. Accordingly, the
premise underlying the State's argument is flawed.
21

Contrary to the State's argument, what Dr. Amador's testimony about the
alternative treatment of motivational enhancement therapy did establish is that there is at
least one less intrusive alternative to forcibly medicating Ms. Barzee. The State did not
rebut this evidence. Moreover, the fact that Ms. Barzee is resistant to formalized therapy
and treatment for a mental illness she does not believe she has does not lead to the State's
conclusion that she would be unwilling to talk to a treating professional in a different
setting. To the contrary, according to Dr. Amador, that is precisely the value of this
alternative therapy because it is designed to treat individuals like Ms. Barzee who exhibit
anosygnosia. R579:186-87, 190-91. The double value inherent in this treatment modality
is that it has both a therapeutic effect and may persuade a patient to voluntarily take
medication that may also have some beneficial aspect. If successful, of course this
treatment modality would make the issues under Sell moot. Id.
Therefore, from the record evidence, it is known that at least one less intrusive
alternative to forcible medication exists. The State failed to elicit any evidence that this
alternative is not a viable treatment for Ms. Barzee. It has never been tried in this case.
Therefore, its viability has to be presumed at this juncture aind it cannot be concluded that
the State met its burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that no less
intrusive alternatives to forcible medication exist.

22

C.

THE FOURTH SELL FACTOR OF MEDICAL APPROPRIATENESS IS SUPERFLUOUS UNLESS CONSIDERED IN THE
CONTEXT OF FORCIBLE MEDICATION.

Ms. Barzee did concede in her Petition that every expert testified that
administration of antipsychotic drugs is medically appropriate in her case. However, this
is not a preservation problem and, as noted in her opening brief and cited by the State,
medical appropriateness will be true with every patient unless there are rare and
unforeseen health problems that might be exacerbated by a proposed medication.
Presumably in such cases, alternative medications will be found that are medically
appropriate. Hence, this factor is meaningless as it will likely always be met.
Nonetheless, the fact that in certain cases such as Ms. Barzee''s, forcible
medication is substantially likely to result in adverse traumatic side effects cannot be
ignored when considering whether such treatment is medically appropriate. It is well
known that depression, suicidal ideation, paranoia, and post-traumatic-stress disorder have
physical as well as emotional ramifications. To argue that it is medically appropriate to
force an emotionallyfragilepatient into a severe depression through involuntary
medication merely because she suffers from an illness that a doctor would normally treat
with medication is a non sequitur.
For this prong of the Sell analysis to be relevant and have meaning, the medical
appropriateness of involuntary medication must be considered.

23

IV.

THE STATE HAS FAILED TO DO MORE THAN ASSERT THAT MS.
BARZEE'S STATE LAW CLAIM IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED.
In just over one page, the State generally asserts that Ms. Barzee's state

constitutional law claim is inadequately briefed and unfairly before this Court, without
more.17 Br. Appe. at 45-6. This conclusory argument is insufficient to rebut Ms. Barzee's
6 pages of argument and legal analysis, including the lengthy legal history of the
compassionate treatment of the mentally ill in this state, and the exceptional circumstances
meriting this Court's consideration of the issue on this appeal.
Accordingly, the State has failed to rebut Ms. Barzee's position and this Court
should consider the issues in this case within the context of the due process protections
afforded in this state.

17

The State makes much of the fact that Ms. Barzee did not cite Utah Code Ann.
§77-15-6.5, the state codification of the Sell factors. This argument is disingenuous. At
the medication hearing, the State indicated on the record:
At the outset, the only other thing that counsel have raised together . . . is the
standard of proof for the Court to make its decision. Sell was silent We each
agree it should be clear and convincing. The Tenth Circuit believes it is clear and
convincing, so that's the case law that's applicable to this federal circuit, and
legislation was introduced last week at the legislature to help these matters in the
future, and that legislation provides for a clear and convincing standard.
R579:6 (emphasis added). Thus, the statute was pending and only enacted after the
medication hearing and after the parties had briefed the issue. The parties could not brief
the issues within the context of pending legislation. Also, the trial court framed its
findings, conclusions, and ruling in the context of Sell, only mentioning the recently
enacted statute incidentally. R530-68. In any event, Ms. Barzee's legal analysis does not
change under the subsequently enacted statute.
24

CONCLUSION
Ms. Barzee respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling
granting the State's motion to compel medication.
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of December, 2006.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
R:579:128,166-67,175-76,186-87,191
(Excerpts from Transcript from Hearing on Motion to Compel Medication)

1

unlikely she is going to become competent, so thatfs not more

2

than likely or even substantially likely, but can you give us a

3

sense for what the percentage rate is that you think she would

4

be around, Ms. Bar zee, the percentage rate you think you would

5

attribute to her in becoming competent again?

6

A

I have given this some thought.

It is not easy to

7

give an exact number.

It would really also depend on the exact

8

diagnosis.

9

at her prognostic factors, if she had -- and depending on the

So I would say, from my experience and also looking

10

diagnosis, it would range somewhere between 20 and 35 percent.

11

If she had a delusional disorder, which has been discussed

12

here, I would give her a lower percentage.

13

schizophrenia, I would give her a better chance of responding.

If she had

14

Q

Psychotic disorder is somewhere in the middle there?

15

A

I think we just have to figure out what the diagnosis

17

Q

Everybody is talking about psychotic disorder NOS,

18

right?

19

A

Right.

20

Q

You run the gamut from delusional disorder to

16

21
22

is.

schizophrenia?
A

Psychotic NOS is simply either schizophrenia,

23

substance abuse psychotic disorder, or psychotic disorder

24

secondary to a medical condition.

25

didn't do a physical exam, but in my assessment I didn't pick

It is one of those.

I
j

1

treating delusional disorder, but that was primarily with

2

patients with somatic delusions, not the grandiose type.

3

Q

Grandiose delusions are a symptom that could be

4

associated with delusional disorder or other psychotic

5

disorders, right?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

But those grandiose delusions themselves, of which

8

everybody agrees Ms. Barzee has and is incompetent because of,

9

are how difficult to treat?

10

A

Much more difficult to treat?

I wouldn't say much more difficult.

If you look at

11

the different subtypes of delusions, delusions of jealousy,

12

somatic delusions, paranoid delusions, grandiose delusions,

13

etc., if you look at that list, I put that as the hardest to

14

treat.

15

Q

She has the hardest delusion to treat?

16

A

Yes.

17
18

Except I am not talking about a big change in

the prognosis; but within those subtypes of delusions, yes.
Q

Can you speak a little about her prognosis and the

19

different factors, indicators?

20

opinion?

21

A

What's her prognosis, in your

I think, given the very long duration of untreated

22

psychosis, given the diagnosis of delusional disorder, given

23

the primary competency impairing symptom of grandiose

24

delusions, there is a very low likelihood.

25

in the United

States

vs.

Ghane,

Again, you know, as

however you pronounce it, the

1

findings of fact there were delusion disorders about a

2

10-percent chance.

3

more optimistic.

4

chance that she will respond to antipsychotic medications to

5

the point where it will restore her to competency.

6

Q

I wouldn't go that far.

I am a little bit

I would say there is maybe a 20-percent

So you are not saying that if she was given

7

antipsychotic medications that she wouldn't respond in

8

different ways?

9

A

From my clinical assessment, in getting to know

10

Ms. Bar zee as well as I have, both through interview and

11

collateral sources of information, I have to agree with

12

Dr. Jeppson, I think the most likely first —

13

a prediction —

14

going to feel less pressure to talk about these things, and

15

that there is a high likelihood that the fundamental delusional

16

beliefs aren't going to change.

if I had to make

the thing that's going to happen is she is

17

Q

18

about here.

19

them.

20

doesn't that render her likely to be competent?

21

A

So that's a distinction that we have been talking
So she will feel less pressured to talk about

So why doesn't that help her back to competency?

Or why

Just because I can have a conversation with you about

22

my case doesn't mean that I have stopped believing that God is

23

in charge of this whole thing.

24

stopped believing.

25

given your hypothetical, it is still going to influence your

It doesn't mean that I have

If you still have those beliefs, rather,

1

about other topics.

2

respect to her delusional thought process itself, the behaviors

3

surrounding it, thinking behaviors surrounding it, that's a

4

different fellow fish.

5

Regardless, we have a very different prognosis on the

6

likelihood that medications are going to impact her delusion.

7

Q

If he was talking about flexibility with

I didn!t hear him talk about that.

(By Mr. Finlayson) I guess you have explained quite a

8

bit as to why you have that prognosis. What is your prognosis?

9

Tell us, on the standard for substantially likely to render her

10
11

competent, could you give us your opinion?
A

Taking together my clinical experience and doing

12

studies on many, many patients with poor insight, with a

13

subgroup of very long durations of untreated psychosis, because

14

of the nature, I have kind of an unusual clinical experience,

15

compared to a lot of other people, in that I have worked in a

16

dedicated National Institute of Mental Health funded

17

schizophrenia research unit. My particular interest is lack of

18

insight, so the patients we are looking for are a lot like

19

Ms. Bar zee, who do not understand, will take many years to ever

20

understand there is an illness. Leaning on all that direct

21

experience and the research, I think you have a very low

22

probability.

23

you sometimes have to, 20-percent likelihood that any

24

antipsychotic medication is going to substantially reduce the

25

severity for delusions to restore her to competency.

My estimate is, if I had to make an estimate, as

1
2

Q

Would that change if it was psychotic disorder NOS or

schizophrenia?

3

A

No. I think it would move me up a little bit, maybe

4

give her about a 30-percent chance.

5

or psychotic disorder NOS, that would move me up.

6

psychotic manic depression, that would move me up to about 35

7

to 40 percent. Actually, even higher, because there is less

8

data on duration of untreated psychosis and bipolar disorder.

9

Q

If it were schizophrenia
If it was

So the duration is a fairly significant factor, the

10

grandiose delusions, treating grandiose delusions themselves,

11

thatfs a significant factor?

12

A

Yes, both.

13

Q

There was something I wanted to ask you about. It

14

has been said today it is difficult to do research on people

15

who don't want to be medicated.

16

read any research on those types of people?

17

A

Have you been experienced or

I have over 100 peer-reviewed articles in the

18

literature that I have coauthored.

19

are exactly on this topic.

20 \ Sick.

I Don't Need Help.
Illness

Accept

I would say half of them

One of my books is called I'm Not
How to Help Persons with a Serious

21

Mental

Treatment.

22

do involuntarily treatment.

23

the reader, whether they are a clinician or family member, how

24

to do involuntary treatment in all 50 states. A lot of

25

experience with involuntarily treating and a lot of experience

Half of that book is how to

It is a step-by-step manual, tells

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Dr. Amador, isn't it true that nowhere in this book

3

do you say at a certain point treatment is hopeless?

4

A

5

right.

6

Q

I am not saying that here today, either, but you are
I am very hopeful about treatment.
I believe that there was some testimony from you that

7

if a person has had a psychotic disorder that has been

8

untreated for a year their prognosis is going to be very, very

9

poor?

10

A

Twenty or 30 percent is not hopeless, in my mind.

11

Frankly, if there was a 5-percent chance I would do everything

12

in my power to convince a patient to take medication if they

13

have never been on it, absolutely.

14

bad thing.

15

that.

16

here today.

17

Q

18

Untreated psychosis is a

I stand by everything that I have ever said about

And that's not the question I have been asked to address

In fact, everything in your book is about getting

these people medication?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

The mentally ill?

21

A

Absolutely.

22

Q

And there is even chapters that talk about

23

involuntary commitment?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

If the mentally ill person has gotten into a state

1

where things are that bad, involuntary commitment is something

2

you help the reader to assess?

3

A

Yes, recognizing the Harper criteria, danger to self,

4

giving them exactly the steps they need to take to

5

involuntarily — who to call, how to maintain a relationship

6

with that person once you have initiated such a proceeding.

7

There is research on this, as well.

8

oftentimes, to treat people against their will.

9

Q

It is very traumatic,

It sounds like it would also be your opinion, as was

10

Dr. Morris', that it is medically appropriate to give

11

medication to Ms. Barzee?

12

A

In a vacuum, yes. If she were my patient, would you

13

like me to answer that question?

14

would engage her and work with her and use an evidenced-based

15

practice called motivational enhancement therapy with her,

16

which I talk about in the book, and try to help her find

17

reasons that she might want to try a medication.

18

reasons have nothing to do with having a mental illness.

19

a very different approach than the doctor knows best

20

psychoeducational approach that she is getting in the hospital

21

here, and most hospitals, frankly, from my reading of the

22

chart, anyway.

23

wouldn't give up hope, no.

24
25

Q

If she were my patient I

Maybe her
It is

So, certainly, as I said a few minutes ago, I

And you were talking about what you would do with

Ms. Barzee, and you would engage in motivational enhancement

1

need?

2

Again, I think these doctors are ready to do that.

3

serious business to force medication against somebody's will,

4

very serious business.

5
6

Q

If you are going to do that you better be sitting ready.
But it is

Yet it is something that with some individuals needs

to be considered?

7

A

Absolutely.

8

Q

I wanted to ask you a question about the discussion

9

that you had about grandiose delusions.

Do I take it, then,

10

that you disagree with Dr. Morris1 testimony that it is not so

11

much the delusion that is the problem for Ms. Barzee, it is her

12

preoccupation with the delusion?

13

A

Would you remind me what Dr. Morris said about that.

14

Q

I believe that Dr. Morris and I agreed it is not the

15

delusion that is the competency concern with Ms. Barzee, it was

16

her preoccupation with the delusion.

17

A

Yeah, I think I would disagree with that.

I think it

18

is both, but, fundamentally, it is the delusional belief

19

itself.

20

no flexibility, like she can consider maybe this isn T t true,

21

that that core, fixed belief is impairing competency.

22

Preoccupation with it, as well.

23

cross examining Dr. Morris I understood your point is also

24

impairing competency.

25

Q

If there is strong conviction in that belief, there is

And the way that when you were

Those are two separate issues.

Would it be your assessment that anyone who has a
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Government sought order permitting forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs to pretrial detainee
accused of killing guards at United States Capitol, in order to render detainee competent to stand
trial. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Emmet G. Sullivan, J., 69
FJ5upp_.2d.99/ issued order. The Court of Appeals, 206_F.3d_9, remanded. On remand, the District
Court, 134 F.Supp.2d 115, reaffirmed its finding that involuntary treatment was medically appropriate
and necessary, and detainee appealed. The Court of Appeals, Randolph, Circuit Judge, held that: (1)
antipsychotic drugs were medically appropriate; (2) government's interest in bringing detainee to trial
was "essential state policy"; and (3) forced medication was necessary in order to restore detainee's
competence, and therefore justified.
Affirmed.
Randolph, Circuit Judge, filed concurring opinion joined by Circuit Judge Sentelle.
Rogers, Circuit Judge, filed concurring opinion.
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Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH, with whom Circuit Judge SENTELLE joins.
Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.
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RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge:
Under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause there is a "significant liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs/' Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 2 2 1 , 110 S.Ct.
1028,. 108 LEd_.2cL178 (1990). This appeal requires us to decide whether the government may
administer such drugs to a pretrial detainee against his will in order to render him competent to stand
trial.

I.
On July 24, 1998, an assailant armed with a .38 caliber revolver forced his way past security
checkpoints at the United States Capitol. He shot and killed Jacob Chestnut and John Gibson, both
officers of the United States Capitol Police. He shot and seriously wounded Douglas McMillan, also an
officer of the United States Capitol Police. Russell Eugene Weston, himself seriously wounded by
gunfire, was arrested at the scene. The federal government indicted Weston on two counts of
murdering a federal law enforcement officer, one count of attempting to murder a federal law
enforcement officer, and three counts of using a firearm in a crime of violence.
The government wants to try Weston for these crimes but is presently unable to do so because the
district court found him incompetent to stand trial. See (/p/teqf S t e l e s y ^
117 (D.D.C.2001); 1 Joint Appendix 45-46 (competency order). The district court accepted the
conclusion of a court-appointed forensic psychiatrist that Weston suffers from paranoid schizophrenia,
and that the severity of his symptoms renders him incapable of understanding the proceedings
against him and assisting in his defense, as required to bring a defendant to trial. See 18 U.S.C. §
4241(a) (statutory competence requirement); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113
S.Ct,„2680, .125 LEd._2d 321 (1993) (constitutional competence requirement). The court committed
Weston to the custody of the Attorney General "for treatment in a suitable facility*875 **147 for a
reasonable period of time." 1 Joint Appendix 46; see also 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).
Weston is currently incarcerated "for treatment" at the Federal Correctional Institute in Butner, North
Carolina. He is not being treated. Rather, he was placed in solitary confinement under constant
observation when he arrived at FCI Butner and remains there today. The Bureau of Prisons apparently
placed him in seclusion to "mitigate [his] dangerousness." kKestPac_„134„F.Supp..2d„at_130. As an
Assistant Director of the Bureau explained, Weston's "mental health seclusion status" is "for very
vulnerable inmates, and [is] typically ••• reserved for those who present a substantial danger to
themselves or somebody else---" 7/24/00 a.m. Tr. at 59. The district court characterized Weston's
confinement situation as "simply the warehousing of Weston in a psychotic state. It is not treatment;
at best it contains dangerousness." 134 F.Supp.2d at 130-31; see also 4 Joint Appendix 103 (Report
of court-appointed expert that "the field places severe limitations on the use of seclusion in clinical
psychiatry because [it] is considered to be inherently aversive when used for prolonged periods of
time.").
There is treatment available for Weston's illness and its symptoms in the form of antipsychotic
medication. The parties agree that such medication is likely the only treatment that can mitigate his
schizophrenia and attendant delusions, and thus restore his competence to stand trial. See Brief for
Appellant at 5; Brief for Appellee at 12-13. Weston is not currently receiving any such medication
because, at a time when he was considered medically competent to make a determination, he refused
them. The district court prohibited the Bureau of Prisons from forcibly medicating Weston without a
court order.
After two administrative hearings and two district court hearings, the government obtained an order
authorizing it to administer antipsychotic medication against Weston's will. See United States v.
Weston, 69 F.Supp.2d 99 (D.P.C1999). The district court held that forcible medication was
"medically appropriate" and "essential for [Weston's] own safety or the safety of others." Id. at 118.
It also found that "the government has a fundamental interest in bringing the defendant to trial," but
determined that the dangerousness holding made it unnecessary to decide whether that interest
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outweighed Weston's right to refuse antipsychotic medication. See /<l„atJL.18-19, The court declined
to consider Weston's claim that forced medication would interfere with his right to a fair trial, holding
it was not ripe. See id._ at.107.
A panel of this court reversed and remanded the case to the district court, holding that the district
court's dangerousness finding was not supported by the record. See United Statesy._ Weston, 206
F.3^_9JpjCJ_Cirs20003 (per curiam). The panel also reversed the district court's determination that
Weston's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial claim was not ripe, holding that "because antipsychotic
medication may affect the defendant's ability to assist in his defense, postmedication review may
come too late to prevent impairment of his Sixth Amendment right." Id. at 14 (citations omitted). The
panel also directed the district court to consider Weston's argument that medical ethics preclude
forcibly medicating a defendant to make him competent for trial in a case that might carry the death
penalty. See id. at 14 n. 3.
On remand, the district court again held that the Bureau of Prisons could forcibly medicate Weston. It
concluded that antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate*876 **148 and "essential to
control and treat Weston's dangerousness to others." Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 127, 131. The district
court also held that the "government has an essential interest in bringing Weston to trial" given "the
serious and violent nature of the charges, that the immediate victims were federal law enforcement
officers performing their official duties, and that the killings took place inside the U.S. Capitol amid a
crowd of innocent bystanders." Id. at 132. The court concluded that forcible medication would not
interfere with Weston's right to a fair trial, and could in some respects enhance his ability to exercise
that right by improving his mental function. See id. at 132-38.
In this appeal, Weston claims that administering antipsychotic drugs against his will violates his Fifth
Amendment due process liberty interest "in avoiding unwanted bodily intrusion" and implicates his
right to a fair trial. See Brief for Appellant at 37-38. In earlier stages of this case, Weston asserted a
First Amendment right to freedom from compulsory medication and challenged the Bureau of Prisons'
administrative procedures under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. — He has not raised
either issue here so we do not consider them. We affirm the district court's conclusion that the
government's interest in administering antipsychotic drugs to make Weston competent for trial
overrides his liberty interest, and that restoring his competence in such manner does not necessarily
violate his right to a fair trial.
FN1. Weston refers in footnote 9 of his brief to the First Amendment, the Fourth
Amendment, and "privacy interests" not attributed to any particular part of the
Constitution. He has supplied no supporting arguments and we therefore will disregard
his references. See, e.g., Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 107 F.3d 32,
39 (D.CCir.1997).

II.
IIIIIIIIL

IIIIIIIIL

H E9
[1]
[2]
The due process liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medication may
be "significant," but it is not absolute. See Kansasy._ Hendricks, J>21 U.S.J346, 356, 117 S.Ct. 2072,
138 LEd.2d 501 (1997); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739", 750-51, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d
697 (1987); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 LEd.2d 28 (1982). In
Washington v. Harper and later in Riggins v. Nevada, the Supreme Court recognized that the
government may, under certain circumstances, forcibly administer antipsychotic medication to a
prisoner or criminal defendant despite his liberty interest, provided such medication is "medically
appropriate." See Riggins v, Nevada, .504 U.S.. 127, 135,-112.S.Ct. 1810, 118 LEd.2d 479 (1992);
Washington v. Harper. 494 U.S. 210, 220, 222-23 & n. 8, 226-27, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 LEd.2d 178
(1990). With respect to Weston, there is no doubt that this latter condition has been met.
Whether a proposed course of action is "medically appropriate" obviously depends on the judgment of
medical professionals. See Harper,_494 U.S.„at 231, 2_33.:.3.4^.110S,Ct._1028; Youngberg, 457 U.S. at
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322123,.102 S.Ct. 2452; Vitek.y.. 3ones,_ 445 U,S..48P,.495,„10.0 S.Ct, .1254, 63_LEd,2d 552 (1980);
Parham v. J. ft., 442 U.S. 584, 606-07, 609, 99 S.Ct. 2493 f 61 LEd.2d 101 (1979); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S.. .418, 429,.99 S,.Ct, 1804, 60 LEd.2d 323 (197.9). The district court relied on several
experts in concluding that "[antipsychotic medication is the medically acceptable and indicated
treatment for Weston's illness." Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 122.
The district court measured the medical appropriateness of antipsychotic medication by examining the
capacity of antipsychotic drugs to alleviate Weston's schizophrenia (the medical benefits) against their
capacity to produce harm **149 *877 (the medical costs, or side effects). See id. at 123. Numerous
experts testified that antipsychotic medication is the medically appropriate treatment for Weston's
illness. E1 ^ While there are potential side effects,— 3 the professional judgment of the medical experts
was that "each of these potential side effects is generally manageable." Id. at_123,125. The short of
the matter is that the record leaves no basis for doubting the district court's conclusion that
antipsychotic medication is the medically appropriate treatment for Weston's condition.
FN2. See, e.g., 8/20/99 a.m. Tr. at 59 (Dr. Johnson testifying that the standard of care
for treating schizophrenia is antipsychotic medication); 4 Joint Appendix 103 (Report of
Dr. Daniel stating that "[antipsychotic medication is essential to the treatment of
psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia. Psychotherapy without antipsychotic
medication is not considered to be an effective treatment for schizophrenia."); 7/25/00
p.m. Tr. at 11 (Dr. Deprato's testimony that "[t]he diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia is
appropriately treated with antipsychotic medication"); 7/26/00 a.m. Tr. at 64 (Dr.
Zonana's testimony: Question: "To your knowledge is there any hospital in this country
that would not attempt to treat this patient with antipsychotic medication to address the
illness as you understand it based on the materials that you've had an opportunity to sit
in and review?" Answer: "Well, I think that is the standard treatment of choice these days
[and] if you don't offer and try to use medication in a situation like this, it is negligent.").
FN3. There are two types of antipsychotic medication-the "typicals" and the "atypicals."
The government proposed to use typicals, which are an older generation of
antipsychotics. The district court found:
Typical antipsychotics can produce the following side effects: (1) dystonic or acute
dystonic reactions, which involve a stiffening of muscles; (2) acuesthesia, which is
restlessness or an inability to sit still; (3) Parkinsonian side effects, which can slow an
individual; (4) tardive dyskinesia, which causes repetitive, involuntary tic-like movements
of the face, eyelids, and mouth; (5) neuroleptic malignant syndrome ("NMS"), which
causes temperature control problems and stiffness; and (6) perioral tremor, referred to
as rabbit syndrome because of the mouth movements associated with it.
134 F.Supp.2d at 123. The atypicals, which the government has not ruled out, are newer
and "have a more favorable side effect profile." See /d.__.at .124., The court found that side
effects from atypicals include: (1) Agranulocytosis, which could result in death but for
which "there is a highly effective monitoring system to prevent this result"; (2) sedation;
(3) weight gain; (4) seizures; and (5) problems with lipid metabolism. See id. It appears
that antipsychotic medications could also alter Weston's demeanor, emotional affect, and
cognitive function. See 7/24/00 p.m. Tr. at 49-50; 7/25/00 a.m. Tr. at 22-24; 7/26/00
a.m. Tr. at 62-63.
Weston claims that the ethical obligations a doctor owes a patient preclude forcible medication in
these circumstances. As he sees it, "the question whether the administration of antipsychotic
medication is medically appropriate is different from the question whether treatment is therapeutically
appropriate." Brief for Appellant at 18. Thus, "[t]he context in which the forced medication issue
arises and the state purpose are relevant considerations for the physician to decide whether it is
ethical to force-medicate." Id. If the state's purpose is to make one competent for trial, Weston
argues, then a doctor must consider alternatives such as civil commitment. See id. These ethical
norms purportedly derive from the Hippocratic Oath and the 1982 United Nations Principles of Medical

rage / o i 1 /

Ethics Relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, Particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners
and Detainees against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
See Brief for Appellant at 19.
No source of legal authority-neither Bureau of Prisons regulations, nor the statute governing
treatment of incompetent pretrial detainees, nor the Constitution*878 -makes **150 medical ethics
relevant to the determination whether the government can forcibly medicate Weston. Even if a
particular doctor had ethical objections to administering antipsychotic drugs to a non-consenting
patient, this would not undercut the consensus in the medical profession that antipsychotic
medication is the medically appropriate response to Weston's c o n d i t i o n . —
FN4. Defense counsel also claims that Weston's decision while he was medically
competent not to take antipsychotic medication makes such medication medically
inappropriate. See Brief for Appellant at 45. We shall assume arguendo that Weston's
previous decision reflects his current informed judgment (which of course is unknowable).
Nonetheless, withholding of consent does not make a treatment medically inappropriate.
In Harper, for instance, the inmate reportedly said he "would rather die than take
medication," 494 U.S. at 239, 110 S.Ct. 1028 (Stevens, J., separate opinion), but the
Court approved the treatment as in the inmate's medical interest.

A. Mitigating Dangerousness
A pretrial detainee's liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medication gives way when
the medication is essential to mitigate the detainee's dangerousness: "Nevada certainly would have
satisfied due process if the prosecution had demonstrated, and the District Court had found, that
treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive
alternatives, essential for the sake of [the pretrial detainee's] own safety or the safety of others."
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135, 112 S.Ct. 1810. The district court applied this standard to Weston's
situation and twice found antipsychotic medication medically appropriate and essential for his safety
or the safety of those around him. See Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 121-32; Weston, 69 F.Supp.2d at
107:10.
On appeal of the district court's first decision, a panel of this court found the record insufficient to
support application of the Riggins standard. Much of the evidence focused on the government's
competency-for-trial justification-which the district court did not adopt-and the limited evidence
supporting the dangerousness justification "indicates that in his current circumstances Weston poses
no significant danger to himself or to others." Weston, 206 F.3d_at 13. The panel relied on the
testimony of a Public Health Service physician assigned to FCI Butner that "[g]iven [Weston's]
immediate containment situation, I feel confident that we can prevent him from harming himself or
others under his immediate parameters of incarceration where he is in an individual room with limited
access to anything that he could harm himself with or harm anyone else with, and he remains under
constant observation." 2 Joint Appendix 121; Weston, 206 F.3d at 13. The panel concluded that
involuntary medication was not "essential" for safety and instructed the district court that *[i]f the
government advances the medical/safety justification on remand, it will need to present additional
evidence showing that either Weston's condition or his confinement situation has changed since the
hearing so as to render him dangerous." Id.
On remand, the district court received additional evidence showing that Weston's condition had
deteriorated. In view of this evidence, the court once again found that Weston posed such a danger
that medicating him was warranted. We think the previous panel's decision likely precluded that
finding. That panel held that Weston's situation in confinement-total seclusion and constant
observation-obviated any significant danger he might pose to himself or others. There appears no
basis to believe that Weston's worsening condition renders him more dangerous *879 **151 given
his near-total incapacitation. Weston remains in seclusion under constant observation. Absent a
showing that Weston's condition now exceeds the institution's ability to contain it through his present
state of confinement, the prior decision appears to preclude a finding of dangerousness. See LaShawn
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Ay. Barry, 87__F.3d.1389, 1.393, 1395(D.C.Cir.l996) (en banc) (law-of-the-case and law-of-thecircuit doctrines). We need not determine whether our concurring colleague's different interpretation
of the previous panel's decision is correct in view of our affirmance of the district court's competencyfor-trial ground of decision. See Concurring Op. of Rogers, J., at 889-90.

B. Restoring Competence to Stand Trial
In Riggins, the Court prescribed the conditions sufficient for a dangerousness justification, but
explicitly declined to "prescribe ••• substantive standards" for determining when other government
interests override a pretrial detainee's liberty interest in refusing antipsychotic medication. See
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136, 112 S.Ct. 1810; see also Weston, 206 F.3d at 12-13 (also declining to
prescribe substantive standards). The Court did, however, suggest that the governmental interest in
restoring a pretrial detainee's competence to stand trial could override his liberty interest: "the State
might have been able to justify medically appropriate, involuntary treatment with [antipsychotic
medication] by establishing that it could not obtain an adjudication of [the pretrial detainee's] guilt or
innocence by using less intrusive means." Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135, 112 S.Ct. 1810.
"The substantive issue involves a definition of the protected constitutional interest, as well as
identification of the conditions under which competing state interests might outweigh it." Harper, 494
U.S. at 220. 110 S.Ct. 1028 (quoting Af/7/s v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 2 9 1 , 299 r 102 S.Ct. 2442, 73 L.Ed.2d
1_6_(1982)) (internal brackets omitted); see also Fpucha.y._XouisjarLaj_504JJ.$. 7_1, 116, l_12.S.Ct.
1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The standard of review determines when
the Due Process Clause ••• will override a State's substantive policy choices, as reflected in its laws.").
Weston argues that the appropriate substantive standard is strict scrutiny and that involuntary
medication must be "narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest." See Brief for
Appellant at 36-37; accord United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947 r 957 (6th Cir.1998^ (strict
scrutiny applies to determination whether governmental interest in medicating nondangerous pretrial
detainee to make him competent for trial outweighs liberty interest); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387,
1396 (10th Cir.1984) (requiring use of "less restrictive alternatives"); see also Kulas v. Valdez. 159
F.3d 453, 455 (9th Or. 1998) (using heightened scrutiny under Riggins)) United States v. SanchezHurtado, 90 F.Supp.2d 1049, 1055 (S.P.Cal.1999) (same); Khiem v. United States, 612 A.2d 160,
165-66 (D.C.1992) (as amended on rehearing) (applying Riggins and requiring "a showing of
overriding justification and medical appropriateness"). The government argues for an arbitrary and
capricious standard like that employed to review administrative agency action. See Brief for Appellee
at 22-27; accord Harper, 494 U.S. at 223, 110 S.Ct. 1028 (applying reasonableness standard to
forcible medication of prisoners to mitigate dangerousness); Weston, 206 F.3d at 14-15 (Henderson,
J., concurring); United Statesy. Charters, 863 F.2d .302, .306.(4th Ci.r..l_988) (en banc) (liberty
interest "is protected against arbitrary and capricious actions by government officials"); United States
v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 262 (4th Cir.1999) ("under Charters,, the determination*880 **152 of
whether to forcibly medicate a pretrial detainee ••• rests upon the professional judgment of
institutional medical personnel, subject only to judicial review for arbitrariness"); United States v.
Keeven, 115 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1137 (E.P.Mo.2000) (following Morgan); cf. Jurasek v. Utah State
Hosp., 158F.3d 506,.511 (10th Cir,1998) (applying Harper's reasonableness standard to civilly
committed patient); see also Charters, 863_F.2d.at 312.-13 (professional judgment standard from
Youngberg v. Romeo); Morgan v. Rabun, 128 F.3d 694, 697 (8th Cir.1997) (same).
The Supreme Court denied that it had adopted a strict scrutiny standard in Riggins. See Riggins, 504
U.S. at 136, 112 S.Ct. 1810. It also appeared not to apply a reasonableness test or its various
analogues: arbitrary and capricious, rational basis, or exercise of professional judgment. Rather, the
opinion's language suggests some form of heightened scrutiny: the emphasis on the severity of
infringement antipsychotic drugs impose on an individual's liberty interest, see id. at 134, 112 S.Ct.
1810; the reasoning that "forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent
a finding of overriding justification," id. at 135, 112 S.Ct. 1810 (emphasis added); the statement that
medicating to mitigate dangerousness must be "essential" and that the trial court must consider "less
intrusive alternatives," id.; and the criticism of the district court's failure to find that "safety
considerations or other compelling concerns outweighed Riggins' [liberty] interest," id. at .136,. 112
S.Ct. 1810.
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We think the appropriate standard is the one the Court set forth in the penultimate
paragraph where it noted the lack of a "finding that might support a conclusion that administration of
antipsychotic medication was necessary to accomplish an essential state policy----''Id. at 138 r 112
S.Ct. 1810. Although that paragraph addressed trial prejudice, it outlines the standard the state failed
to meet in ascertaining whether a governmental interest outweighs a right to avoid antipsychotic
medication. Accordingly, to medicate Weston, the government must prove that restoring his
competence to stand trial is necessary to accomplish an essential state policy.--FN5. The district court held the government to a clear-and-convincing-evidence burden of
proof. See 1.3.4 F._Supp.2d atJ121 A.n.._12. Neither party challenges this determination.

1 . The Essential State Policy in Adjudicating Criminality
Preventing and punishing criminality are essential governmental policies. The Supreme Court has
recognized that preventing crime is a compelling governmental interest. See Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253 f 264, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 LEd.2d 207 f l 9 8 4 ) ; United States v. Salerno. 481 U.S. 739 f 74950, 107 S.Ct, 2095 / „95.LEd.2d 697.(1987). This interest lies not just in incapacitating dangerous
criminals, but also in demonstrating that transgressions of society's prohibitions will be met with an
appropriate response by punishing offenders. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62, 117
S1Ct,„2072/„ 138 LEd,2d.50:L(1997); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 7 1 , 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118
LEd.2d 437 (1992). The Court has repeatedly adverted to the government's "compelling interest in
finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law/' Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426,
106 S.CL1135, 89 L.E.d.2d 410 (1986); accord Texasy. Cpfcfi,„5_32 U,S..162, -_«-, 121 S,Ct. 1335*
1343, 149 LEd.2d 321 (2001); Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 202, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d
294 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181. I l l S.Ct. 2204, 115
LEd,2d„ 158.11991); *881 * * 153 Richardson y. Marsh, 481U.S. 200,_210,__107 S.Ct. 1702, 95
LEd.2d 176 f l 9 8 7 ) ; Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 796, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The Court in Riggins recognized the strength of the government's policy in adjudicating criminality
when it stated that the government "might" be able to involuntarily medicate a defendant if "it could
not obtain an adjudication of [his] guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means," 504 U.S. at 135,
112_.S^Ct,_.1810/ and when it cited Justice Brennan's statement that "Constitutional power to bring an
accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of'ordered liberty 7 and prerequisite to social justice and
peace," id. at 135-36, 112 S.Ct. 1810 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25
L.Ed.„2d 353 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). We do not believe the Court's use of "might" reflects
any tentativeness about whether the government could ever justify medicating to restore competence
to stand trial. If that were what the Court had in mind we doubt that it would have included the
statement. We read "might," rather, as indicating that the interest in adjudicating criminality is not
necessarily an essential state policy under all circumstances. Cf. Brandon, 158 F.3d at 960-61 (no
compelling interest in trying man accused of sending a threatening letter; factors relevant to this
determination include seriousness of the offense, whether the pretrial detainee is dangerous, and
whether the detainee will be released if not tried); Khiem, 3X2 A,26_at 176 & n,_ 1 (Ferren, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("Whereas the District may have a compelling state
interest in force-medicating Khiem [to try him for murder], the District will not necessarily have such
an interest in force-medicating pretrial detainees charged with lesser crimes.").

[4]
We need not decide under what circumstances trying and punishing offenders is not
"essential." The government's interest in finding, convicting, and punishing criminals reaches its
zenith when the crime is the murder of federal police officers in a place crowded with bystanders
where a branch of government conducts its business. The Court made the point in Salerno: "While the
Government's general interest in preventing crime is compelling, even this interest is heightened
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when the Government musters convincing proof that the arrestee, already indicted or held to answer
for a serious crime, presents a demonstrable danger to the community. Under these narrow
circumstances, society's interest in crime prevention is at its greatest." 481 U.S., a„t.750, 107 S.Ct
2095; see also Khiem, 612 A.2d at 167; but see Bee v. Greaves. 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th
Cir.1984). The statutory sentences for the crimes Weston is accused of committing-life in prison and
death-reflect the intensity of the government's interest in bringing those suspected of such crimes to
trial. See 18JU,S,C_§§__1Ill, 1.114.
Weston concedes that in "the ordinary case, the strength of the government's interest in trying a
defendant accused of first degree murder is undisputed," but argues that when "the government
seeks to forcibly medicate a defendant in order to try him, however, the case is no longer ordinary,
because presumptions against forced medication have deep roots in the law." Brief for Appellant at
43. This argument is a reprise of the medical ethics point we considered and rejected in determining
whether antipsychotic medication is medically appropriate. It has no more purchase here. The
"presumption" against forced medication goes to the importance of Weston's constitutional right to
refuse antipsychotic drugs (which we agree is substantial), not to the nature of the government's
countervailing interest.
We also do not believe that the "governmental interest in medicating a defendant * 8 8 2 **154 in
order to try him is diminished ••• by the option of civil commitment." Note, Riggins v. Nevada: Toward
a Standard for Medicating the Incompetent Defendant to Competence, 71 N.C. L.REV. 1206, 1223
(1993). The civil commitment argument assumes that the government's essential penological
interests lie only in incapacitating dangerous offenders. It ignores the retributive, deterrent,
communicative, and investigative functions of the criminal justice system, which serve to ensure that
offenders receive their just deserts, to make clear that offenses entail consequences, and to discover
what happened through the public mechanism of trial. Civil commitment addresses none of these
interests. In Weston's case, civil commitment would be based on his present mental condition, not on
his culpability for the crimes charged: "criminal responsibility at the time of the alleged offenses ••• is
a distinct issue from his competency to stand trial." Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 739, 92 S.Ct.
1845, 32 LEd.2d 435 (1972); see also 18 U.S.C. § 4241(f) ("A finding by the court that the
defendant is mentally competent to stand trial shall not prejudice the defendant in raising the issue of
his insanity as a defense to the offense charged, and shall not be admissible as evidence in a trial for
the offense charged.").

2. Involuntary Medication is Necessary and there are no Less Intrusive Means
The sole constitutional mechanism for the government to accomplish its essential policy is to take
Weston to trial. See U.S. CONST, amend. V (no deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process). Antipsychotic medication is necessary because, as the district court found, "antipsychotic
medication is the only therapeutic intervention available that could possibly improve Weston's
symptom picture, lessen his delusions, and make him competent to stand trial." Weston, 134
F.Supp.2d at 132. The government cannot "obtain an adjudication of [Weston's] guilt or innocence by
using less intrusive means." Riggins, 504 u.s. at 135, 112 S_.Ct 1810.

£5]
Although Weston does not propose any alternative means, he claims that the fit between
involuntary medication and the government's interest is not sufficiently tight in two respects. First, he
argues that the medication will not restore his competence to stand trial because he is not likely to
respond to it. Second, he contends that the medication's mind-altering properties and likely side
effects will prejudice his right to a fair trial such that the government could not lawfully try him even
if his competence were restored. Either way, the argument goes, there is an insufficient probability
that forcible medication will satisfy the government's interest.
We will treat what Weston styles the "narrow tailoring" requirement of strict scrutiny as an attack on
the "necessity" of antipsychotic medication. In determining whether a governmental interest overrides
a constitutional right, courts examine not only the nature of the right and the strength of the
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countervailing interest, but also the fit between the interest and the means chosen to accomplish it.
This inquiry entails a predictive judgment about the probable efficacy of the means to satisfy the
interest. In the terms of this case, antipsychotic medication may not be "necessary" if its use will not
permit the government to try Weston.
That antipsychotic medication must be necessary to restore Weston's competence to stand trial does
not mean there must be a 100% probability that it will produce this result. As the Court has
recognized, "necessity" may mean "absolute physical necessity or inevitability" or "that which is only
convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper, or conducive to the end *883 **155 sought."
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.f 492.U.S. 490, 515 n. 13, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 LEd.2d 410
(1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary); see also Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 476-77, 109 S.Ct 3028 r 106 LEd.2d 388 (1989). Even narrow tailoring in strict scrutiny
analysis does not contemplate a perfect correspondence between the means chosen to accomplish a
compelling governmental interest. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 1 9 1 , 206-10, 112 S.Ct. 1846,
119 LEd.2d 5 (1992) (plurality opinion).
The government has established a sufficient likelihood that antipsychotic medication will restore
Weston's competence while preserving his right to a fair trial. See Brandon, 158 F.3d at 960. The
district court acknowledged that "it is not certain that the medication will restore Weston's
competency," but " c r e d i t e d ] the ••• testimony of the mental health experts that this outcome is
likely." Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 132. The government presented evidence that antipsychotic
medication mitigated symptoms for at least 70 percent of patients. See 7/24/00 p.m. Tr. at 108-09;
8/20/99 a.m. Tr. at 56; 11/15/00 a.m. Tr. at 57. Dr. Johnson testified that the response rate is
probably higher with the atypicals. See 7/24/00 p.m. Tr. at 108-09. The government also provided
reason to believe that the probability of restoring competence might be higher in Weston's case
because of Weston's "relatively little exposure to antipsychotic medication" and his generally positive
response to the limited medication he received in 1996. See Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 122; see also
8/20/99 a.m. Tr. at 56; 7/27/00 a.m. Tr. at 120-21; 4 Joint Appendix 105 (Report of Dr. Daniel).
The small possibility that antipsychotic medication will not make Weston competent for trial is
certainly tolerable considering that antipsychotic medication is the sole means for the government to
satisfy its essential policy in adjudicating the murder of federal officers. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 20708, 112 S.Ct. 1846 (emphasizing that the means chosen is the "only way" to satisfy the state's
compelling interest). The district court made the most precise predictive judgment it could in this
context. See 8/20/99 a.m. Tr. at 56 (Dr. Johnson's testimony that "you are unable to predict in the
individual case whether that individual will actually respond").
Weston points out that there is also a possibility that antipsychotic medication could prejudice his
right to a fair trial by, for instance, altering his courtroom demeanor, interfering with his recollection
and ability to testify, and obstructing his right to present an insanity defense. We agree with the
district court that "[t]here is no reason to conclude, at this time, that involuntary medication would
preclude Weston from receiving a fair trial." Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 137.
The general right to a fair trial includes several specific rights such as the right to be tried only while
competent, that is, while able to understand the proceedings, consult with counsel, and assist in the
defense. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 f 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 LEd.2d 103 f ! 9 7 5 ) . As we
determined, there is a sufficiently high probability that antipsychotic medication will restore Weston's
competence to stand trial. The district court found and the evidence indicates that "a strong likelihood
exists that medication will enhance some of Weston's trial rights, particularly his right to consult with
counsel and to assist in his defense." Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d„at 133.- —
FN6. See 7/24/00 p.m. Tr. at 8 (Dr. Johnson's testimony that " I would really expect him,
from a mental status standpoint, to be functioning in a much enhanced manner over his
current psychotic state to the point where I believe his competence could be restored");
id. at 9 (Dr. Johnson stating that " I actually firmly believe that treatment with the
medication will enhance his ability to follow the issues at the trial"); 7/25/00 a.m. Tr. at
24 (Dr. Johnson's testimony that "successful treatment would result in a decrease in his
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delusional thinking, hopefully a resolution of that, an increase in his attention, ability to
concentrate, and a change in his affect, or the way his mood appears to someone who is
looking onto the situation. His preoccupation with his delusional system has led me to
believe at various points that he has also experienced some hallucinatory phenomena,
and I would expect that to resolve.").
*884 **156 Another aspect of the right to a fair trial is Weston's right to testify and "to present his
own version of events in his own words." Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U..S. „44,„49, .52, 107 S.Ct .2704,_.97
L.Ed.2d 37 (1987). The defense is concerned that the medication might affect Weston's memory and
his capacity to relate his delusions and other aspects of his mental state at the time of the crime,
which in turn "may impair his ability to mount an effective insanity defense." Weston, 206 F.3d at 21
(Tatel, J., concurring); see also 18 _LLS,_C. § 17 (affirmative defense of insanity). But the record
contains no basis to suppose that antipsychotic drugs will prevent Weston from testifying in a
meaningful way. Rather, it indicates that medication will more likely improve Weston's ability to relate
his belief system to the jury. See 7/24/00 p.m. Tr. at 49-51. The benefits of antipsychotic medication
in terms of Weston's ability to understand the proceedings and communicate with his attorneys
presumably will also translate into an improved capacity to communicate from the witness stand. And
although memory loss is a potential side effect, Dr. Johnson testified that she thought "he'd be able to
remember his belief system." 7/24/00 p.m. Tr. at 50 (also stating that " I don't think the treatment
would impact his memory"); see also 7/25/00 a.m. Tr. at 4-5 (Dr. Johnson's testimony that " I don't
expect him to lose the memory of his delusional beliefs as a result of treatment").
There is a possibility that the medication could affect Weston's behavior and demeanor on the witness
stand such that the jury might regard his "synthetically sane" testimony as inconsistent with a claim
of insanity. As Justice Kennedy put it in Riggins, " [ i ] f the defendant takes the stand ••• his demeanor
can have a great bearing on his credibility and persuasiveness, and on the degree to which he evokes
sympathy." Riggins, 504 U.S.. at_l42,112 S.Ct._1810 (Kennedy, J., concurring). We recognize this
small risk, but we see little basis to suppose that the jury will take Weston's testimony (if he decides
to testify) as an indication that he must have been sane at the time of the crime, or that he is making
it up, or that he deserves no sympathy. There is ample evidence of Weston's history of mental illness
and bizarre behavior; the jury's overall impression of Weston will depend as much on this evidence as
his testimony.
The district court also correctly held that a defendant does not have an absolute right to replicate on
the witness stand his mental state at the time of the crime. See Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 134. A
defendant asserting a heat-of-passion defense to a charge of first degree murder does not have the
right to whip up a frenzy in court to show his capacity for rage, nor does a defendant claiming
intoxication have the right to testify under the influence. See Weston, 206 F.3d at 15 (Henderson, J.,
concurring). There is little meaningful distinction between these cases and medication-induced
competence to stand trial. Either way, the defendant's mental state on the stand is different from the
mental state he claims to have operated under at the time of the crime. The tolerable level *885
**157 of difference no doubt increases in a case like this where there is substantial evidence of
mental state other than the defendant's present appearance.
Weston will not have to rely solely on his own testimony to show his state of mind on July 24, 1998.
Involuntary medication therefore stands little chance of impairing his right to present an insanity
defense. There is extensive documentation and testimony concerning Weston's delusional system, his
history of mental illness, and his "behavior, appearance, speech, actions, and extraordinary or bizarre
acts ••• over a significant period." Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 135-36. Multiple experts have examined
Weston and presumably may testify. Many of these examinations no doubt related to his trial
competence, but "[t]he tapes and psychiatric reports ••• document Weston's delusional state over
several years." Id. at 135. There is also a taped interview in which Weston discussed his delusional
beliefs with the Central Intelligence Agency. See id. at 135_n._22. Given the wealth of expert and lay
testimony and other documentation the district court described, see id. at 135-36, Weston's insanity
defense does not stand or fall on his testimony alone.
A third trial right that could be implicated by antipsychotic medication is Weston's right to be present
at trial in a state that does not prejudice the factfinder against him. See Estelle v._ Williams^ 425 U.S.
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501^503:04, 96 S5Ct. 1691, 48.LEd.2d 126 (.1976); Illinois_v.. Allen, 397 U.S..337, 338^.344, 90
S.Ct. 1057, 25 LEd.2d 353 (1970). To the extent the medication alters Weston's demeanor,
courtroom behavior, or reactions to events in the courtroom, it may cause the jury to see Weston in a
state that might seem inconsistent with a claim of insanity. It could also produce a flattened
emotional affect that could convey to the jury a lack of remorse, a critical consideration if this case
proceeded to sentencing.
Here again the record indicates that medication will likely enhance rather than impair Weston's right
to a fair trial. Dr. Johnson stated that medication "will alter [Weston's demeanor] to the extent that it
will be more a return to his baseline non-psychotic state. I would anticipate he would have less
blunting or flattening of his affect. He would be able to respond more appropriately from an emotional
standpoint with his facial expression than he is now/' 7/24/00 p.m. Tr. at 8; see also 7/25/00 a.m.
Tr. at 22-24 (Dr. Johnson agreeing with the proposition that, with medication, Weston's "expressions
potentially could be more appropriate to the context of what's occurring in the courtroom"; also, her
testimony that "[i]t is the patient who is over-medicated or whose side effects are not managed who
would demonstrate an increased lack of responsiveness").
The possibility of side effects from antipsychotic medication is undeniable, but the ability of Weston's
treating physicians and the district court to respond to them substantially reduces the risk they pose
to trial fairness. The district court found that Weston's doctors can manage side effects in a number of
ways: "the Court credits the testimony of the government experts and Dr. Daniel, the independent
expert, that the side effects of medication are manageable through adjustments in the timing and
amount of the doses, and through supplementary medications." Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 137; see
also 11/15/00 a.m. Tr. at 125 (Dr. Daniel's testimony that antipsychotic medications have side effects
but "[generally they can be treated or an adjustment made in the medication, or the medication
replaced with a different one. There's generally a way to deal with the side effects."); 4 Joint
Appendix 102 (Statement in Dr. Daniel's report*886 **158 to the district court that "the side effects
can most often be managed or an alternative course of treatment provided to the benefit of the
patient. General experience with antipsychotics, particularly the newer medications, indicates that
given their benefits they are reasonably safe and well-tolerated."). As the Court wrote in Harper, the
"risks associated with antipsychotic drugs are for the most part medical ones, best assessed by
medical professionals." 494 U.S. at 233, 110 S.Ct. 1028. m z
FN7L Antipsychotic drugs have progressed since Justice Kennedy discussed their side
effects in Riggins. There is a new generation of medications having better side effect
profiles. See Weston^ 134„F.Supp,2d at 134 (citing Justice Kennedy's concurrence and
writing that "[a]dvances in the primary antipsychotic medications and adjunct therapies
make such side effects less likely"); Paul A. Nidich & Jacqueline Collins, Involuntary
Administration of Psychotropic Medication: A Federal Court Update, 11 No. 4 HEALTH
LAWYER 12, 13 (May 1999) ("[I]n light of the progress made in the development of new
antipsychotic medications since the Supreme Court's Riggins decision in 1992, the courts
should revisit this issue with an open mind---- [Because of new atypicals,] the fear of side
effects should not weigh heavily in the decision whether to treat pretrial detainees or
civilly committed persons with antipsychotic medication against their will when that
treatment is medically appropriate."). Although the government presently plans to
medicate Weston with the older generation of typicals, it could switch to the newer
atypicals if side effects from the typicals threaten to impair his right to a fair trial. The
district court analyzed the side effects of both. See Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d at 123-25.
Dr. Johnson testified that Weston cannot be treated with atypicals unless he agrees to
take them orally. See 7/24/00 a.m. Tr. at 108-09. The parties dispute whether Weston
would so agree. When Weston originally withheld consent to antipsychotic medication, he
indicated that he would comply with court-ordered medication. See 5/28/99 a.m. Tr. at
3.
The district court also has measures at its disposal: "If Weston is medicated and his competency is
restored, the Court is willing to take whatever reasonable measures are necessary to ensure that his
rights are protected. This may include informing the jurors that Weston is being administered mind-
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altering medication, that his behavior in their presence is conditioned on drugs being administered to
him at the request of the government, and allowing experts and others to testify regarding Weston's
unmedicated condition, the effects of the medication on Weston, and the necessity of medication to
render Weston competent to stand trial." Weston,. 134.„F„._Supp„..2d at_137. Weston is free to propose
other options.
There is a very high probability that involuntary medication will serve the government's essential
interest in rendering Weston "competent to stand trial in a proceeding that is fair to both parties."
Brandon,. 158 F,3d at 9 5 4 . £ y s Given the lack *887 **159 of alternative means for the government
to satisfy its essential policy, we cannot demand more.
FN8. Although the bulk of Weston's fair trial argument relates to the narrow tailoring
aspect of his Fifth Amendment substantive due process argument, he makes a fleeting
reference to an independent right to a fair trial in arguing for strict scrutiny: "Weston's
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial are also at stake because the forced
administration of antipsychotic medication may 'have a prejudicial effect on [Weston's]
physical appearance at trial' and have an adverse effect on his 'ability to participate in his
own defense.' " Brief for Appellant at 37. To the extent this cursory reference suffices to
raise this claim, this is not the occasion to evaluate it. Whether antipsychotic medication
will impair Weston's right to a fair trial is best determined when the actual effects of the
medication are known, that is, after he is medicated. (This is in contrast to the narrow
tailoring component of Weston's bodily integrity claim, which requires a predictive
judgment now.) As Judge Tatel stated in the previous panel opinion, "the difficulty
inherent in predicting how a particular drug will affect a particular individual may well
lead the district court to conclude that it cannot make this determination about Weston
without first medicating him. In that event, I see no reason why the potential for side
effects would preclude the district court from ordering medication, provided that, should
Weston become competent to stand trial, the district court conducts a second hearing to
determine the extent to which any side effects Weston is actually experiencing might
affect his fair trial rights." Weston, 206 F.3d at.21 (Tatel, J., concurring). The district
court stated that it "will conduct subsequent evidentiary hearings" on this point. Weston,
134 F.Supp.2d at 138; see also United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 264-65 (4th
Cir.1999).

I I I . Guardian ad Litem
Weston also appeals the district court's refusal to appoint a guardian ad litem. The district court
concluded that it lacked authority to appoint a guardian and expressed uncertainty about what
function a guardian would perform if appointed. See 7/24/00 a.m. Tr. at 2-3.
We need not decide whether the court had discretion to appoint a guardian and, if so, whether it
abused that discretion in declining to exercise it. The issue is not relevant to the outcome of this case.
If the guardian consented on Weston's behalf, the government presumably may medicate him. See
Reply Brief for Appellant at 24-25 (stating that a guardian "would effectively stand in Weston's shoes"
and that "Weston's counsel also explained at a hearing that a guardian could take the position that
the guardian should do as the guardian saw fit with Weston-which would include allowing
medication"); see also 7/27/00 a.m. Tr. at 108-09. If the guardian withheld consent, we are in the
same position as without a guardian: the government's interest in restoring Weston's competence to
stand trial outweighs his liberty interest. If the guardian issue is otherwise relevant, Weston has failed
to show it.
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Because antipsychotic medication is medically appropriate and is necessary to accomplish an essential
state policy, the district court's order permitting the government to forcibly medicate Weston is

JL

a^c U U i

1/

Affirmed.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judge SENTELLE joins, concurring:
I write separately because I believe United States v. Weston, .206 R3d 9 (D.C.Cjr.2000), our first
decision in this case, may have embodied a serious error.
Concluding that Weston was not sufficiently dangerous to warrant forcibly medicating him, the panel
wrote that "in his current circumstances Weston poses no significant danger to himself or to others."
Weston, 206 F.3d at 13. This was so because Weston was confined to a room, under constant
observation and had no access to anything he could use to harm himself or others. See id. The
upshot, the panel concluded, was that " [ i ] f the government advances the medical/safety justification
on remand, it will need to present additional evidence showing that either Weston's condition or his
confinement situation has changed since the hearing so as to render him dangerous." Id.
This standard puts the government in an unnecessary quandary. If Weston were no longer confined to
a room and under constant surveillance, he would be dangerous and, presumably, could be
medicated. However, because the government cannot medicate him while he is carefully confined-and
therefore, not dangerous-it cannot release him into the general pre-trial detention population without
incurring substantial risks. The result: the *888 **160 government is all but forced to keep Weston
in isolation, a condition almost everyone agrees is detrimental to Weston's long-term mental health.
The statutes-18 U.5.C. §§ 4241-4247-provide a far different standard for dangerousness than the
prior panel's decision, and represent not only the good judgment of Congress and the President, but
also the Judicial Conference of the United States which "after long study by a conspicuously able
committee, followed by consultation with federal district and circuit judges," proposed the legislation.
Greenwood y. United States, _350.U_.S- 3 6 6 ^ 3 2 3 , 7 6 S.Ct 410, 100 LEcL 412.(1956.). Under § 4246,
a person is to be held and treated if "his release would cause a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another person or serious damage to property of another." 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d) (italics added). Thus,
the question on Weston's first appeal should not have been whether he was dangerous given the
manner in which he was confined, but whether he was dangerous as a general matter, that is, if he
were released from strict confinement and observation.
Our concurring colleague proposes a different reading of the prior panel's decision. Because of the
problems just discussed, I hope her view eventually prevails even though the language of that
opinion, quoted above, does not seem to support her.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I write separately on two points: the findings necessary for forcible administration of medication in a
pretrial context, and the determination of dangerousness to support such governmental intrusion.
First, following the instruction in Rigginsy. Nevada, 504 U._S_.127, 112 S.Ct. 1810,. l_18.LEd.2d 47.9
(1992), the court applies a "form of heightened scrutiny," Opinion at 880, in considering a number of
factors for balancing the interests of the government and the defendant. Succinctly put, to medicate
Weston against his will, "the government must prove that restoring his competence to stand trial is
necessary to accomplish an essential state policy." Opinion at 880. The substantive analysis that the
court employs encompasses, however, at least three distinct determinations. To allow the
government forcibly to medicate a defendant prior to trial with antipsychotic drugs, the district court
must find that: (1) an "essential state policy" is at issue, Riggins,_ 504 U.S. at .138, 112_S_Ct 1810;
(2) "treatment with antipsychotic medication [is] medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive
alternatives, essential for the sake of [the defendant's] own safety or the safety of others," or
essential to enable an adjudication of the defendant's guilt or innocence, id. at 135, 112 S.Ct. 1810;
and (3) the defendant's due process rights are protected. See id. at 137-38, 112 S.Ct. 1810.
The district court on remand made these three determinations. See United States v. Weston, 134
F.Supp.2d 115, 138 (D.D.C.2001) ( Weston III). On appeal, this court addresses the first
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determination under the heading 'The Essential State Policy in Adjudicating Criminality." Opinion at
880. It addresses the second and third determinations under the heading of "Involuntary Medication
is Necessary and there are no Less Intrusive Means." Id. at 882-83. The court provides a separate
analysis of each determination. Id. at 883-87.
Keeping these determinations separate is important because the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that a defendant's liberty interests may outweigh the State's interest. Although indicating that even
"a substantial probability of trial prejudice" can be justified if "administration of antipsychotic
medication [is] necessary to accomplish an essential state policy," *889 **161 Riggins, 504 U.S. at
13.8j_112_S.Ct. 18_1_Q, the Court has suggested that the defendant's liberty interests would prevail
where, for example, the antipsychotic medication impairs the defendant's "ability to follow the
proceedings" or to present a defense. Id. at 137, 112 S.Ct. 1810; see also Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162, 171-72, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86
S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). In such circumstances, the government would have the option of
seeking civil commitment of the defendant. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 145, 112 S.Ct. 1810 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in the judgment); see generally 18_U.S_.C_ §§.4241-4247; D.C.Code 1981__§§.21-_541 to
21-551. For the reasons set forth by the court, the due process concerns relating to evidence of
Weston's mental state and to his competency to stand trial are attenuated. See Opinion at 883-87.
Second, the court eschews review of the district court's determination on remand that forced
medication was justified because of Weston's dangerousness to himself or others. The court views our
decision in United States y._ Weston, 206.F.3d.9 (P.CCir,2000) (per curiam) ( Weston II) to have
"likely precluded" a finding of dangerousness in the absence of evidence that "Weston's condition now
exceeds the institution's ability to contain [his dangerousness] through his present state of
confinement." Opinion at 879. To suggest that Weston II created a "standard" other than the
traditional dangerousness standard applicable to pretrial detainees is to misread Weston II. See
Concurring Opinion at 887-88; see also Opinion at 879; 18 U.S.C 5 4246fd^f2); 28 CF.R. 6 549.43.
The court in Weston II did not "put[ ] the government in an unnecessary quandary." Concurring
opinion at 887. The court's language must be read in context. In stating that " [ i ] f the government
advances the medical/safety justification on remand, it will need to present additional evidence
showing that either Weston's condition or his confinement situation has changed since the hearing so
as to render him dangerous," Weston II, 206 F.3d at 13, the court was addressing the insufficient
evidence of dangerousness in the record before it to support a finding that involuntary medication
was "essential" for Weston's safety or the safety of others. See id. That evidence showed that as then
confined in isolation by the government, Weston did not, in the opinion of the government's treating
psychiatrist, pose a significant danger to himself or others. See id. What was missing from the district
court record was a "searching inquiry into whether less intrusive alternatives [to forced medication]
would have been sufficient to control any potential danger posed by Weston to himself and to others."
Id. at 18 (Rogers, J., concurring in the judgment). The court forewarned, however, that to rely on
dangerousness as a basis for forced medication, the government on remand would need to present
evidence that showed more than that when confined Weston did not pose a significant danger to
himself or others. See id. at 13. The government thus remained free to present evidence about the
risks of danger that would be created if Weston was not confined in isolation and that less intrusive
alternatives to forced medication would be ineffective to control his dangerousness.
The record on remand indicates that the parties and the district court understood what "additional
evidence" of dangerousness was required by Weston II; none has suggested that the government
confronted a "quandary." See Br. for Appellee at 28, 38, 41-42; see also Opinion at 879. Expert
medical testimony was offered on Weston's dangerousness in and out of seclusion, distinguishing
between Weston's state of mind and his ability to act on his delusions. See, e.g., Test, of Dr. Daniel,
*890 **162 4 JA at 27-73. To the point, the government now argues in its brief that Weston's
"seclusion from the general population is not an 'alternative' to involuntary medication because it has
done nothing to quell [his] dangerous behavior," Br. for Appellee at 42, and that " 'prolonged use' of
seclusion 'brings risk of detrimental effects to the psychological well-being of the patient,' and is
'inherently aversive.' " Id. at 43 (quoting expert medical testimony presented on remand). Hence, the
government's "quandary" is a creation of the concurrence.
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LEXSEE 427 F. SUPP. 2D 696
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. HERBERT G. EVANS, JR., Defendant.
Case No. 1:02CR00136
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
VIRGINIA, ABINGDON DIVISION
427F. Supp. 2d 696; 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 40549
April 20, 2006, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Affirmed by United States
v. Evans, 2006 US. App. LEXIS 23263 (4th Cir. Va.,
Sept. 12, 2006)
PRIOR HISTORY: United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d
227, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5949 (4th Cir. Va., 2005)

COUNSEL: [**1] S. Randall Ramseyer, Assistant
United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for United
States of America.
Monroe Jamison, Abingdon, Virginia, for Defendant.
JUDGES: JAMES P. JONES, Chief United States District Judge.
OPINION BY: JAMES P. JONES
OPINION:
[*697] OPINION AND ORDER
By: James P. Jones
Chief United States District Judge
In this criminal prosecution, the government has
moved for permission to involuntarily medicate the defendant in order to render him competent to stand trial.
For the foregoing reasons, and subject to the strict conditions set forth herein, I will grant the government's motion.

I. BACKGROUND.
The defendant Herbert G. Evans is charged with
forcibly interfering with a United States Department of
Agriculture employee and threatening to murder a magistrate judge. Evans suffers from paranoid schizophrenia
and it is agreed that he is incompetent to stand trial. Evans has refused antipsychotic medication to restore his
competency and in 2003 the government moved for au-

thorization to medicate him involuntarily. After a hearing, and applying the four-part test articulated by the
Supreme Court in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166,
123 S. Ct. 2174, 156 L Ed. 2d 197 (2003), I granted the
government's [**2] motion. United States v. Evans,
2004 US. Dist. LEXIS 4204, No. L02CR00136, 2004
WL 533473 (W.D.Va. Mar. 18, 2004).
Evans appealed, arguing that the first, second, and
fourth prongs of Sell were unmet, nl The Fourth Circuit
vacated this court's decision and remanded for further
proceedings. United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227 (4th
Cir. 2005). In its opinion, the court of appeals disagreed
with Evans regarding Sell's first prong, holding that there
was adequate evidence that the government's prosecutorial interest was sufficiently important to involuntarily
mediate Evans. Id. at 238, 239-240. However, it found
erroneous my factual conclusions regarding the second
and fourth Sell prongs-whether the government had
adequately demonstrated that its prosecutorial interest
was significantly furthered by involuntary medication,
and whether involuntary medication was medically appropriate. It held that the government had failed to articulate with sufficient particularity the medications it
planned to administer to Evans, the potential side effects
particular to Evans' medical condition, and [*698] a
plan for responding to the onset of such side effects. Id.
at 240-41. [**3]

nl The third prong, whether medication is
necessary, is not at issue here. I originally resolved the necessity requirement in the government's favor, and that finding was not challenged
on appeal.
In its opinion, the Fourth Circuit "emphasized that
[the Sell] principles require an exacting focus on the personal characteristics of the individual defendant and the
particular drugs the Government seeks to administer."
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United States v Baldovinos 434 F 3d 233 240 n 5 (4th
Cu 2006) (charactenzmg Evans decision)
Following remand, the government submitted to the
court a new forensic evaluation prepared at the Federal
Medical Center m Butner, North Carolina ("Burner") In
response to the Fourth Circuit's finding of a lack of
specificity, the new evaluation (the "Butner Report")
detailed the process by which the government proposed
to involuntarily medicate Evans, and included the particular medications and dosages to be used, the methods
of administering those drugs, and a treatment [**4] plan
for responding to side effects In reply to the Butner Report, Evans submitted a report co-authored by Margaret
S Robbms, M D , and Thomas E Schacht, Psy D ,
("Robbins Report"), which included objections to the
course of treatment proposed m the Butner Report and
rebutted the analysis regardmg the cited literature review Both reports are summarized m greater detail hereafter
On February 10, 2006, an evidentiary hearing was
held m obedience to the directions of the court of appeals
relating to the second and fourth Sell prongs Testifying
at that heanng were Byron Herbel, M D , a psychiatrist at
Butner, for the government, and Drs Robbins and
Schacht for the defendant The parties have timely submitted additional briefing, and the issues are now ripe for
decision
II THE FORENSIC EVALUATIONS
The Butner Report
I begm by setting out the treatment plan proposed by
the Butner Report Butner proposes treatmg Evans first
with long-acting risperidone (Risperdal Consta), a second-generation antipsychotic medication, to be administered by injection In order to determine Evans' ability to
tolerate risperidone, Butner proposes administering small
test doses of [**5] short-acting risperidone over the
course of two days one-half milligram on day one, and
one milligram on day two In administering the initial
doses, Butner would first attempt to persuade Evans to
mgest the oral doses voluntarily, if he refuses, Butner
proposes to restrain Evans, insert a nasogastric tube, and
administer the test doses in that manner
If Evans tolerates the test doses with no adverse reaction, Butner proposes beginning injections of twentyfive milligram doses at two-week intervals, momtormg
Evans for therapeutic benefit and medication side effects
Sustamed release of the medication would begm approximately four weeks after the initial injection The
report predicts that symptoms would begin to improve
after six to eight weeks, though an adequate antipsychotic trial would only be reached after three to four
months of continuous treatment Serum risperidone lev-

els could be obtained to provide guidance for dosage
adjustments up to fifty milligrams every two weeks If
after an adequate medication tnal Evans' symptoms continue to be resistant, then treatment with a substitute antipsychotic medication should be considered
The Butner Report provides that during [**6] the
risperidone treatment, Evans would be momtored for
neuromuscular and metabolic side effects, the latter being more prevalent with second-generation drugs The
report provides a specific plan for administering adjunctive medication to manage any neuromuscular side effects that mamfest, [*699] including treatment with an
alternative antipsychotic should the side effects persist
despite adjunctive treatment Also during the nspendone
treatment, Evans would be momtored for negative effects
on his diabetes, using the standard Butner protocols including weighing, body mass mdex recordmgs, fingerstick glucose, and serum lipid measure, all on a monthly
basis Evans would also be counseled on relevant lifestyle modifications should side effects arise
If it became necessary to discontinue the nspendone
treatment, the Butner Report suggests a first alternative
plan usmg long-actmg halopendol (Haldol Decanoate) m
an injectable form, implementing a similar test dose
strategy as with the risperidone treatment Initially, Evans would be administered test doses of one milligram
for two days, either in oral form or through injection,
dependmg on Evans' cooperation A nasogastric tube is
[**7] not indicated for administration of halopendol
Barring any adverse event following the test doses, Evans would be administered twenty-five milligrams of
long-acting halopendol at two-week intervals With serum halopendol momtonng, the dose could be mcreased
not to exceed 150 milligrams in a four-week penod
The Butner Report proposes a second alternative
treatment plan, which would require Evans to cooperate
consistently n2 with daily mgestion of an alternative second-generation oral antipsychotic medication, anpiprazole, m daily 7 5 milligram doses After an observation
period, the report provides that the dose would be increased by increments of 7 5 milligrams as clinically
mdicated up to forty-five milligrams daily A third alternative treatment plan would require Evans' consistent
cooperation m ingesting daily doses of secondgeneration antipsychotic ziprasidone m twenty milligram
oral dose5 daily After a period of observation, the report
provides that the dose could be mcreased by mcrements
of twenty milligrams up to an eighty milligram dose
twice daily

n2 The Butner Report predicts that Evans'
cooperation is unlikely
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[**8]
In addition to the treatment plan and the literature
review summarized in more detail below, the Butner
Report offered an extended history of Evans' mental
health treatment, including two instances of involuntary
medication using haloperidol injections in the 1980s,
although treatment records noting specific doses and
duration are sparse. Other records show that Evans was
hospitalized three times at Southwestern State Hospital.
In 1976, he received no medication; in 1979, he was
treated with Mellaril, though his delusions persisted
throughout treatment. In January 1981, Evans took Serentil for four days, but was then forcibly medicated in
February with "calmer" results that were recorded only
as long as his brief hospitalization. Evans advised that
during these hospitalizations, he experienced serious
neuromuscular side effects, including drooling, pacing,
and jaw locking and characterized the experience as "torture."
In 1984, during Evans' last hospitalization, he was
again treated with Mellaril, resulting in minimization of
his delusional beliefs. It is the 1984 successful treatment
history upon which the Butner Report relies to support its
opinion that Evans' symptoms are not [**9] treatmentresistant.
In arguing that the involuntary medication of Evans
meets the Sell standard, the Butner Report provides a
number of empirical data studies indicating a substantial
success rate with involuntary medication for patients like
Evans. Two studies by Ladds and colleagues support the
premise. The Ladds studies involved a [*700] group of
sixty-one incompetent pretrial defendants referred for
involuntary psychotropic treatment. Of the forty-five
who were involuntarily medicated, eighty-seven percent
were rendered competent.
The Butner Report also cited guidelines of the
American Psychiatric Association ("APA") issued in
2004 for treating schizophrenia, which provide a number
of statistics related to treatment of schizophrenia. The
guidelines provide that first-episode patients are more
responsive to treatment, multi-episode patients are
slightly less responsive, and all patients are subject to
relapse within one or two years. Ten to thirty percent of
patients will have little to no response to treatment, and
an additional thirty percent exhibit some response. Factors relevant to Evans that predict poor treatment response include male gender, severe hallucinations and
delusions, [**10] history of side effects, and long duration of untreated psychosis. The Butner Report contends
that applying the APA guidelines relevant to Evans suggests a probability of competency restoration between
ninety percent in the best case and forty percent in the
worst case. An additional study provided that group

probabilities do not speak to individual cases given the
unpredictability of the illness itself.
The report also cited a study by Lasser, which considered the favorable response of fifty-seven elderly individuals with schizophrenia or a related disorder to
treatment with long-acting risperidone. Treatment resulted in significant improvement of symptoms with a
"low rate" of adverse side effects.
The Butner Report cited a record review not yet
published by Stelmach, involving twenty-one patients
with delusional disorder admitted to Butner for competency restoration. Sixteen of the twenty-one were restored to competency after treatment with antipsychotic
medication. No patients met the particular profile of Evans.
The report contains a number of additional studies,
summaries of which are not necessary here.
The Butner Report offered empirical data rebutting
Dr. Robbins' opinion [**11] that Evans' delusions are
impervious to medication. While the Butner physicians
found no data on patients specifically matching Evans'
profile, there was data supporting a more optimistic outcome than that suggested by Dr. Robbins. A study by
Tirupati and colleagues described one-year treatment
outcomes for forty-nine patients with schizophrenia left
untreated for many years. In that case, forty-seven percent of patients having been ill for five years or less had
good outcomes, while only six percent of those untreated
for over fifteen years had good outcomes. However, the
the data sample was unlike Evans because Evans has a
high level of functioning despite his long history of illness. The report contends that the data from all the studies cited, when viewed in light of the characteristics distinguishing Evans from the study samples and his history
of positive response to treatment with medication, indicates that treatment is more likely than not to restore him
to competency.
In brief, the Butner Report responds to the Fourth
Circuit's remand order by setting out a carefully detailed
initial treatment plan followed by a number of alternatives, a plan for monitoring and responding [**12] to
side effects generally and related specifically to Evans'
medical condition, and a literature review supportive of
its position.
The Robbins Report.
The Robbins Report offered a number of objections
to the Butner Report's proposed course of treatment, and
offered alternative [*701] analysis regarding the studies
cited by that report. Dr. Robbins' arguments are summarized briefly below.
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With regard to the specific treatment plan proposed
for Evans, Dr Robbms opined that antipsychotic medication is unlikely to restore his competency She believes
that the long duration of his delusions without treatment,
when combined with the fact that the substance of Evans'
delusions correlates so accurately with his current legal
status, results m delusions that would be particularly
treatment-resistant It is also Dr Robbms' position that,
when taking all of the relevant factors mto account, and
m particular the negative factors listed in the APA Practice Guidelines, n3 Evans' delusions are likely impervious to medication In support of that assertion, Dr Robbins looks to the Tirupati and Silva studies cited by the
Butner Report Tirupati, which does not address delusional patients, shows [**13] that long duration of untreated psychosis, at least twenty years m Evans' case,
produces "dismal" prospects for treatment with medication Silva's study produced seven delusional patients,
none of whom responded to medication

n3 As detailed above, factors suggesting an
unfavorable treatment outcome for Evans mclude
the fact that Evans is male, the long duration of
Evans' untreated psychosis, his long-standmg
negative attitudes about treatment, the seventy of
his delusions, a history of side effects, and the
provision of medication in an adversarial context
In response to the government's contention that the
1984 positive treatment response proves that Evans' delusions are not impervious to medication, Dr Schacht
testified that when the medical history is viewed as a
whole, one observes many more instances m which
medication was not successful m treating Evans' symptoms Further, Dr Schacht mdicated that "fair remission," as indicated in the treatment notes, does not necessarily correlate with other [**14] treatment notes indicating persistent delusions, and has no consistent medical
meanmg
Dr Robbms did not offer objections to the particular
medications prescnbed m the Butner Report, although
she strongly opposed the use of a nasogastric tube for the
administration of the test doses BothDr Robbms'report
and her testimony at the hearmg indicated that the nsks
mvolved in inserting a nasogastric tube, particularly on
an uncooperative, combative patient, far outweighed its
possible benefits Dr Robbms recommended that a test
dose be administered in a soluble tablet form, which dissolves immediately upon contact with a moist surface
and provides minimal risk of harm to an uncooperative
or combative patient
The Robbms Report also criticizes the particularity
with which the Butner treatment plan proposes to re-

spond to side effects relatmg to Evans' high blood pressure and diabetes, particularly m light of the fact that side
effects most prevalent with second-generation antipsychotics, like risperidone, are metabolic in nature The
proposed treatment plan provides m general terms that it
will monitor for side effects using a standard protocol,
and will refer Evans to [**15] medical management
should his diabetes worsen However, Dr Robbms pomts
out that the plan fails to set out the specific conditions
which, if reached, would or should result in discontinuing treatment or other measures n4

n4 For example, the Robbms Report queries
the specific actions to be taken should Evans'
diabetic condition, currently managed by oral
medication, worsen to the pomt of requiring daily
insulin injections
The Robbms Report further criticizes the treatment
plan's lack of specificity regardmg [*702] a response to
negative side effects relating to Evans' hypertension
Particularly, the report's concerns are based on the potential for low blood pressure caused by simultaneous
treatment with risperidone and Evans' antihypertensive
medication Also criticized is the Butner Report's failure
to consider the possibility of mcreased hypertension induced by stressful encounters related to Evans being
medicated against his will
The Robbms Report also critiques the Butner Report's statements regardmg [**16] possible side effects
caused by treatment with antipsychotic medication With
regard to the Lasser study involving the use of longacting risperidone on elderly patients, Dr Robbms pomts
to the fact that while the study reports a "low rate" of
side effects that rate is never explicitly quantified in the
report Dr Robbms contends that the court should reach
its own conclusion regarding whether the side effect incidence m Lasser was, m fact, low Further, Dr Robbms
contends that Evans is distinguishable from the patients
mcluded in the Lasser study because, m relevant part,
those patients had been previously stabilized on oral
risperidone for at least two weeks Accordmg to Dr
Robbms, the Lasser study speaks most clearly about patients who, unlike Evans, have already tolerated and
benefited from voluntary treatment with antipsychotic
medication The report also states that, generally, the
possibility of side effects capable of hindering Evans'
defense cannot be adequately predicted m advance
Generally and m response to the literature review
proffered by the Butner Report, the Robbms Report and
related hearing testimony assert that the individuals included m the [**17] group research studies cited by the
Butner Report lack important similarities to Evans' par-
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ticular diagnosis and symptoms, namely that Evans carries a delusional diagnosis rather than a diagnosis of generalized schizophrenia. Additional factors lacking from
group research are Evans' long duration of untreated psychosis, long-standing negative attitudes toward treatment, and the administration of medication in an adversarial manner. Further, the report disputes the Butner
Report's equation of "positive treatment response" with
"restoration of competency," arguing that medicating
Evans may result in positive responses, e.g., reduction in
agitation, that have no impact on his overall competency.
With respect to the particular reports cited, the Robbins Report rebutted the Butner Report's conclusions
regarding the Ladds studies, noting a lack of comparison
to a control group, lack of report on the duration of untreated psychosis, and an inflated success rate, among
other criticisms. Dr. Schacht's testimony at the hearing
offered a similar criticism. The Robbins Report offers
additional specific critiques to each of the studies cited
by the Butner Report, which I will not detail here.
[**18]
On the whole, Dr. Robbins believes that antipsychotic medication is unlikely to return Evans to competency, and that the Sell prongs therefore cannot be met.
I next review the evidence in light of the legal standard articulated by the Supreme Court and make the necessary findings of fact.
III. ANALYSIS.
Sellv. United States.

Sell's second prong requires the government to show
that involuntary medication will "significantly further"
its prosecutorial interest. Involuntary medication "significantly furthers" the government's prosecutorial interest when it is (1) substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial and (2) substantially
unlikely to produce side effects that will significantly
interfere with the defendant's ability to assist his counsel
at trial, thereby rendering the trial unfair. Id. at 181.
After carefully reviewing the record in this case, I
find that involuntary medication is substantially likely to
render Evans competent to stand trial, and is substantially unlikely to produce side effects that will significantly interfere with Evans' defense.
I find persuasive a number of factors contained in
the Butner Report. The Ladds study, finding an eightyseven percent return to competency [**20] by those
forcibly medicated, is compelling evidence regarding the
probability of restoring Evans' competency in this case.
Also persuasive is Dr. Herbel's opinion that Evans' 1984
positive response to antipsychotic medication n5 after
twenty years of no treatment suggests that Evans may
reasonably be expected to have a similar outcome when
treated again with antipsychotic medication. Relatedly, I
find convincing Dr. Herbel's opinion that Evans' high
level of functioning suggests that, notwithstanding his
years without treatment, he has not suffered a decreased
response thereof, and that, in his own day-to-day experience, a patient's negative view of medication is not associated with a decreased response to treatment. n6

In Sell v. United States, 539 US. 166, 123 S. Ct.
2174, 156 L. Ed. 2d 197 (2003), the Supreme Court clarified the legal standard the government is required to
meet in seeking the involuntary medication of a defendant for the purpose of rendering the defendant competent to stand trial. It [*703] held that the government
may involuntarily medicate a defendant so long as (1) the
government prosecutorial interest is "important," (2) involuntary medication will "significantly further" that
interest, (3) involuntary medication is necessary to further that interest, and (4) involuntary medication is
"medically appropriate." Id. at 180-81. While the Supreme Court in Sell failed to articulate a standard of
proof to govern consideration of this sort of claim, the
parties do not seriously dispute that the appropriate standard requires the government to prove its [**19] case by
clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, I will
evaluate the government's case under that standard.
Pursuant to the Fourth Circuit's remand, only the
second and fourth prongs are relevant to these proceedings. I will review each in turn.
"Significantly Further."

n5 The record indicates that in 1984, Evans
was forcibly medicated with a relatively low dose
of antipsychotic medication, and that the medication was successful in restoring his competency.
n6 At the hearing, Dr. Herbel testified that he
had personally been involved in eighty involuntary medications, although the majority were
medicated absent the use of force. Dr. Herbel recalled twenty-two incidents in the last calendar
year requiring the use of force for involuntary
medication, of which seventy-seven percent resulted in competency restoration. No forced
medication in the past year, and only one forced
medication in thirteen years resulted in an injury
to the patient.
[**21]
Taking all of the factors into consideration, Dr. Herbel opined that Evans maintained an estimated seventy to
eighty percent chance of being restored to competency.
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Dr. Robbins, testifying on behalf of Evans, admitted that
even though she believes it unlikely that medication will
restore Evans to competency, involuntary medication for
the purpose of restoring competency is appropriate in
some situations. I find that Dr. Herbel's opinion, [*704]
when considered in light of the evidence and scientific
studies produced in the Butner Report, presents clear and
convincing proof that Evans is substantially likely to be
restored to competency for trial purposes.
I also find clear and convincing evidence to support
the government's assertion that involuntarily medicating
Evans is substantially unlikely to produce side effects
rendering him incapable of assisting in his defense.
While it is apparent from the literature cited by the Butner Report that troublesome side effects, mainly metabolic in nature, are common with second-generation antipsychotics, they generally are not so serious as to inhibit Evans' assistance with his own defense. During
treatment, Evans' high blood pressure and diabetes
[**22] will be closely monitored, but do not add to the
risk of nor enhance the severity of side effects. Neither
does there appear to be a strong risk that the subject matter and deep-seeded nature of Evans' delusions will significantly interfere with his defense despite treatment.
Further, the treatment plan proposed by Butner consistently calls for close monitoring of Evans' response to the
drugs, as evidenced by the use of test doses, serum level
testing, and commitment to using the lowest effective
dose.
Accordingly, after taking into consideration all of
the evidence presented in the reports and at the evidentiary hearing, I find that the government has met its burden with respect to Sell's second prong, namely, that
involuntary medication of Evans will significantly further its prosecutorial interest.
"Medically Appropriate."
Sell's fourth prong requires a finding that involuntary medication is medically appropriate, or in the best
interest of the patient in light of his medical condition.
Sell 539 U.S. at 181. Sell counseled that a court should
consider the specific kind of drug administered, its side
effects, and its levels of success. Id.
The Butner [**23] Report specifically considers
whether involuntary medication is medically appropriate
under the circumstances and reaches an affirmative conclusion that it is appropriate. In support, the Butner Report included an article by Lasser, detailing a study of
favorable treatment response of long-acting risperidone
on fifty-seven elderly patients with schizophrenia.
Treatment resulted in a low rate of adverse side effects
caused by the medicine.

Further, as described in detail above and in accordance with the Fourth Circuit's remand, see Evans, 404
F.3d at 242, the Butner Report proposes in clear, careful
detail a primary course of treatment with three alternatives, an estimated length of time after which Evans'
competency would be restored, criteria to be used in determining when treatment should be discontinued, a plan
for monitoring for possible side effects specific to Evans'
condition and medical history, and an explanation of the
benefits and costs of such treatment. I find, with two
exceptions explained below, that the government's contention that the proposed course of treatment is medically
appropriate is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Dr. Herbel reported [**24] that antipsychotic medication "is the only intervention that will be likely to restore [Evans'] competency to stand trial." (Tr. at 46.)
Because Evans' has expressed an intent to be uncooperative with medication, the Butner Report chose a longacting antipsychotic, risperidone, in order to reduce the
necessity for forceful encounters with Evans in administering the medication. A second-generation antipsychotic
was chosen for the first course of treatment in order to
avoid the neuromuscular side effects Evans [*705] experienced previously with exposure to haloperidol,
though both psychiatrists at the hearing testified that the
past side effects were likely caused by overdosing.
Risperidone is the only second-generation antipsychotic
available in a long-acting form.
As to treatment duration, Dr. Herbel testified at the
evidentiary hearing that Evans would need to be treated
with an antipsychotic medication for between four and
five months in order to restore him to competency. If
Evans failed to respond within five months, the government would seek leave to begin administering an alternative antispyschotic medication for an additional four to
five months. Treatment would be discontinued [**25]
either after two five-month treatment cycles with two
separate antipsychotics followed by no improvement in
Evans' condition, or earlier with the onset of intolerable
side effects.
As detailed above, the Butner Report clearly sets out
the side effects that may potentially arise with the use of
antipsychotic drugs, and describes a specific plan to be
carried out in monitoring Evans' response to the drugs.
Because second-generation antipsychotics produce
metabolic side effects that could potentially affect Evans'
blood sugar and high blood pressure, both would be
closely monitored during his treatment. Risk of such side
effects is reduced due to the fact that the Butner Report
ruled out using those second-generation antipsychotic
drugs with the highest propensity for metabolic side effects. Onset of any side effects would be addressed
though a doctor-patient meeting and possible drug substi-
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tution. Taken in total, I find that the government's proposals are medically appropriate and supported by clear
and convincing evidence.
The government has failed to meet its burden with
regard to the proposed use of a nasogastric tube for administration of test doses. The Butner Report and testimony [**26] at the hearing propose restraining Evans
and inserting a tube through his nose into his stomach,
and administering small, short-acting doses of antipsychotic medication as a means of gauging Evans' tolerance of the drug. While sound reasoning supports the
administration of test doses of risperidone prior to use of
the long-acting version, the medical appropriateness of
using a tube for that purpose is not supported by clear
and convincing evidence. Risks involved in inserting the
tube include accidental passage into the pulmonary tract
and perforation of the esophagus, all of which are more
likely in patients, like Evans, who are uncooperative during insertion. Dr. Robbins characterized the risks as "lifethreatening" at the evidentiary hearing. (Tr. at 136.)
Medical appropriateness is made more questionable in
light of the fact that risperidone appears to be available
in an orally disintegrating tablet form. n7 The risks associated with the use of a nasogastric tube outweigh the
benefits of treatment in this case. Accordingly, because
the government has failed to meet its burden of proof on
this issue, I find that the test doses of risperidone must be
administered in soluble tablet [**27] form instead of by
a nasogastric tube.

n7
Risperdal
M-Tab(R).
See
http://www.risperdal.com/html/ris/consumer/pd_r
isperidone.xml?article=dosing.jspf
The government has also failed to meet its burden
with regard to its proposed response to a worsening of
Evans' diabetes. Currently, Evans' diabetes can be managed with daily oral medication, which Evans takes voluntarily. While the Butner Report sets out a means of
monitoring [*706] Evans' glucose and insulin levels and
generally takes into consideration the potential for a
worsening of Evans' diabetes, the report fails to provide
in adequate detail the actual steps to be taken should Evans' diabetes in fact worsen, particularly to the point of
requiring daily insulin shots. I do not find clear and convincing evidence that the current treatment plan is medically appropriate with regard to a worsening of Evans'
diabetes. Accordingly, because the government has
failed to meet its burden of proof on this issue, I will
direct that, in the event that Evans' diabetes worsens
[**28] to the point of requiring daily insulin shots, the
government must cease treatment with the antipsychotic

currently in use and return to this court with a new proposal.
IV. CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons and pursuant to the following conditions, the government's motion to involuntarily medicate Evans is GRANTED. It is ORDERED
that the government may involuntarily medicate Evans in
an effort to restore him to competency subject to the following conditions:

1. The government may initiate treatment
with risperidone pursuant to the dosing
schedule provided in its proposed treatment plan:

a. The government may
administer test doses of
short-acting risperidone;
b. The government must
not administer test doses
using a nasogastric tube,
but may use short-acting
risperidone only in an oral
form or in a soluble tablet
form;
c. If Evans tolerates the
test doses, the government
may administer long-acting
risperidone by injection
pursuant to the dosing
schedule provided in its
proposed treatment plan
for no longer than five
months.

2. If risperidone test doses are unable to
be given, or if risperidone treatment fails
due to lack of effect on symptoms [**29]
or the onset of intolerable side effects, the
government may treat Evans with haloperidol:

a. The government may
administer test doses of
short-acting haloperidol in
the oral or injectable
forms;

Page 8
427 F. Supp. 2d 696, *; 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40549, **

b. If Evans tolerates the
test doses, the government
may administer long-acting
haloperidol by injection
pursuant to the dosing
schedule provided in its
proposed treatment plan
for no longer than five
months;

3. If haloperidol treatment fails due to the
onset of intolerable side effects, the government may initiate treatment with
aripiprazole pursuant to the dosing schedule set out in its treatment plan.
4. If aripiprazole treatment fails due to the
onset of intolerable side effects, the government may initiate treatment with ziprasidone pursuant to the dosing schedule set
out in its treatment plan.

cease and the government must return to
this court with a new proposal.
6. The government must monitor Evans
for neuromuscular, metabolic, and other
side effects during all treatment, and, in
particular, for side effects related to his
diabetes [**30] and hypertension.
7. If at any time during treatment Evans'
diabetes reaches a level requiring daily insulin injections, all antipsychotic medication must cease and the government must
return to this court with a new proposal.
[*707] 8. The government must not deviate from its proposed treatment plan or
from the directions set forth above without first obtaining permission of this
court.
ENTER: April 20, 2006
/s/ JAMES P. JONES

5. The total course of treatment must not
last longer than ten months; after ten
months, all antipsychotic medication must

Chief United States District Judge
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OPINION:
[*736] ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the government's second motion
for authorization to involuntarily medicate defendant
Lawrence Algere with antipsychotic drugs to restore his
competency to proceed to trial. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the government's motion.
I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND
On April 4, 2003, defendant Algere was indicted for
a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On May 9, 2003, on a joint
motion from the government and Algere, the Court appointed a licensed psychologist, Dr. Emily Fallis at the
Federal Medical Center at Fort Worth, Texas, to evaluate
Algere and provide the Court with a written opinion as to
his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of
the alleged offense.
On September 5, 2003, the resulting written report
diagnosed Algere with Schizophrenia, Undifferentiated
[**2] Type, which is characterized by at least a onemonth period in which two or more of the following occur: delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech,
grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, and negative

symptoms (e.g., emotional flattening and poverty of
speech). In Dr. Fallis's opinion, Algere was not competent to stand trial. On September 22, 2003, the Court held
a competency hearing under 18 U.S.C. § § 4241 and
4241, at which counsel for the government, counsel for
the defense and the defendant were all present. Based on
the evidence received, the Court found Algere not competent to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence
and ordered that he be committed to the custody of the
Attorney General for treatment under 18 U.S.C. §
4241(d). The Court also ordered that another written
opinion as to Algere's competency be prepared after the
treatment. Algere was admitted to the Federal [*737]
Medical Center, Mental Health Department, in Butner,
North Carolina.
On August 4, 2004, Dr. Carlton Pyant, a licensed
psychologist, and Dr. Bruce P. Capehart, a licensed psychiatrist at the FMC, submitted a written report reporting
Algere's progress [**3] and evaluating his condition in
accordance with the Court's order. Pyant and Capehart
diagnosed Algere with Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type.
(Rep. of 8/4/04 at 5-6). The doctors noted that paranoid
ideation and marked disorganization dominated the majority of Algere's conversations and that he was intensely
focused on identifying and preparing for conflict with his
enemies. (Id. at 3-4). He was also concerned about contracting diseases from his food. (Id. at 5). Algere also
displayed delusions about the criminal justice system,
stating that he wishes to plead "not guilty with conflict of
interest" meaning "statements they have against you are
not valid." (Id. at 7). Dr. Pyant testified that Algere
agreed to take Abilify less than five times and then refused it because he did not like how he felt on the medication, although no objective observations indicated the
presence of any side effects. The doctors concluded that,
without treatment with antipsychotic medication, Algere
remained incompetent to stand trial. (Id. at 6).
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Because Algere continued to refuse antipsychotic
medication on a voluntary basis, on August 19, 2004, the
government moved to authorize the FMC to medicate
[**4] Algere involuntarily with antipsychotic drugs under the Supreme Court's decision in Sell v. United States,
539 U.S. 166, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 156 L. Ed. 2d 197 (2003).
On October 14, 2004, the Court denied the government's
motion because there was no evidence that the procedures of 28 C.F.R. § 549.43 had been followed. That
section requires that the determination of whether it is
necessary to forcibly medicate an inmate because he is
dangerous to himself or others in his current environment
or to render him competent to stand trial be made in the
context of an administrative hearing, nl The inmate must
be given twenty-four hour advance written notice of the
hearing and be afforded the right to appear at the hearing,
to present evidence, to be represented by a staff member,
and to request that witnesses be questioned. 28 C.F.R. §
549.43(a)(2).

nl It appears to be the Bureau of Prisons1 position that, after Sell, this administrative hearing
procedure is no longer valid when the medication
is to be administered involuntarily solely for the
purposes of restoring competency for trial. See
United States v. Barajas-Torres, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13232, No. CRIM.EP-03-CR-2011KC,
2004 WL 1598914, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Tex. July 1,
2004). The procedure was necessary in this case,
however, because there had not been any administrative determination regarding Algere's dangerousness, which Sell requires a court to consider before it authorizes involuntary medication
on other grounds. 539 U.S. at 181-82. The determination of an inmate's dangerousness involves
prison administration and is probably better made
by prison authorities and medical professionals
most familiar with the inmate through frequent
and ongoing clinical observation. See Washington
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223-34, 231, 110 S Ct.
1028, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1990).
[**5]
The administrative hearing was held on November
11, 2004 and resulted in an administrative determination
that involuntary medication was not warranted on the
ground that Algere was dangerous to himself or others at
the FMC, in large part because he is safely housed in a
single cell in a restricted unit. (Involuntary Medication
Rep. of 12/2/04 at 7-10). The government does not challenge the determination that Algere is not dangerous to
himself or other in his current environment. Algere remains confined at the [*738] FMC, no anti-psychotic

drugs have been administered, and he remains incompetent to stand trial.
The government now moves for a second time that
the Court order that Algere be involuntarily medicated to
render him competent to stand trial. The Court scheduled
a hearing on the government's motion and ordered that
the government submit a supplemental report addressing
several specific issues regarding the proposed treatment.
The Court held a hearing on June 29, 2005, at which the
Court heard testimony from Dr. Pyant and Dr. Jean Zula,
the chief psychiatrist at FMC, who are both familiar with
Algere's case.
The report indicates, and Dr. Pyant testified, that
Algere's thinking and [**6] speech are consistently disorganized, and he continues to express fears about being
physically harmed by others. On 2/23/05, for example,
Algere reported suffering from a knee injury caused by
someone entering his cell and attacking him while he
slept. (Forensic Addendum of 6/10/05 at 3). He also
thinks that the judge is working against him, and he feels
"mistreated by the Court." (Id. at 3-4). Algere fears being
"locked up on falsified legal documents." (Id. at 3). He
displays behavioral disorganization such as wearing
strips of cloth around his limbs because "you never know
when someone will come up and shank you." (Id. at 3-4).
Finally, Algere has expressed that he refuses to take antipsychotic medication because he fears: (1) being convicted of murder; (2) being vulnerable to his enemies;
and (3) getting the death penalty. (Id. at 4). Based on the
evidence produced at the hearing, the Court rules as follows.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
An individual has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in rejecting medical treatment. See Washington v.
Harper, 494 US 210, 211, 110 S Ct. 1028, 108 L. Ed
2d 178 (1990) (recognizing "a significant liberty interest
[**7] in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs"); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 US. 127, 134,
112 S. Ct. 1810, 118 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1992) (repeating that
there is a constitutionally protected "interest in avoiding
involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs"). Such
medication may be forcibly administered, however, in
certain circumstances. In Haiper, for example, the Supreme Court held that administering anti-psychotic drugs
against a prison inmate's will does not violate the Due
Process Clause "if the inmate is dangerous to himself or
others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest." Harper, 494 U.S. at 227. Here, however, the administrative hearing resulted in a determination that forcibly
medicating Algere is not warranted on dangerousness
grounds under Harper because Algere is not dangerous
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to himself or others in his current prison environment.
The government does not challenge that determination.
Accordingly, it is undisputed that this request involves
the involuntary administration of medication to a nondangerous defendant solely for the purposes of restoring
him to competency for trial, which places it squarely
within the standard set forth [**8] by the Supreme Court
in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S. Ct. 2174,
156L.Ed. 2d 197(2003).
In Sell, the Court concluded that the government
may involuntarily administer anti-psychotic drugs "to a
mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in
order to render that defendant competent to stand trial" if
certain conditions are met. Id. at 179. Such treatment is
authorized only if it "is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine
[*739] the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of
less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to
further important governmental trial-related interests."
Id. The Court indicated that this standard requires consideration of four factors: (1) whether important governmental interests are at stake; (2) whether involuntary
medication will significantly further those interests; (3)
whether involuntary medication is necessary to further
those interests; and (4) whether the administration of the
drugs is medically appropriate. Id. at 180-81. Although
the Court did not address the standard by which the Government must establish these factors, at least one other
circuit [**9] has concluded that the government must
present clear and convincing evidence. United States v.
Gomes, 387F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2004).
B. Analysis
1. Important Government Interest
The first prong of the Sell test requires the Court to
"find that important governmental interests are at stake."
Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. There is no question that "the government's interest in bringing an individual accused of a
serious crime to trial is important." Id. At the same time,
however, special circumstances "may lessen the importance of that interest." Id. For example, the defendant's
refusal to take drugs voluntarily may result in lengthy
civil confinement in an institution for the mentally ill,
which diminishes the risks usually present in releasing a
person who has committed a serious crime. Id. Similarly,
the length of time the defendant has already been confined, for which he would receive credit toward any sentence imposed, might lessen the government's interest in
prosecuting him. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). Finally, the
government also has an interest in ensuring that the defendant receives a fair [**10] trial. Sell, 539 US at 180.
To determine whether a crime should be considered
"serious" for the purpose of forcible administration of
medication to restore competency, other courts have

looked to jurisprudence on the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial. See United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227,
237 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Leveck-Amirmokri,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7610, No. EP-04-CR-0961-DB,
2005 WL 1009791, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2005).
Those precedents indicate that offenses for which a defendant may be sentenced to more than six months imprisonment are considered serious enough to invoke the
right to a jury trial. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66, 71, 90 S Ct. 1886, 26 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1970). Most
courts which have considered whether an offense is "serious" in the context of forcible medication have also
followed the recent focus in the jury trial cases on the
maximum penalty that can be imposed for the offense,
rather than the defendant's probable sentencing guideline
range. See Evans, 404 F.3d at 237 (basing determination
as to seriousness of offense on maximum penalty defendant faced if convicted); Leveck-Amirmokri, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7610, 2005 WL 1009791, at *4 [**11]
(same); United States v. Kimball, 2004 US Dist. LEXIS
26586, No. CR03-1025, 2004 WL 3105948, at *3 (N.D.
Iowa Mar. 23, 2004) (same). But see United States v.
Barajas-Torres, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13232, No.
CRIM.EP-03-CR-2011KC, 2004 WL 1598914, at *2-3
and n.4 (W.D. Tex. July 1, 2004) (finding right to jury
trial precedent inapplicable in the context of forcible
medication because different interests are involved in the
two analyses and that "the more accurate reflection of the
seriousness of an offense given the fact-specific analysis
required by Sell would be the relevant guideline range").
[*740] Algere is charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a felony carrying a maximum
term of imprisonment of ten years. The Court concludes
that this is a "serious" offense. See Evans, 404 F.3d at
238 (concluding that a felony with a maximum term of
imprisonment often years is a serious offense "under any
reasonable standard"). But see United States v. Dumeny,
295 F. Supp. 2d 131, 132-33 (finding that charge under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) for possession of firearm by a
person previously committed to a mental health institute,
which carries [**12] a maximum penalty of ten years,
not sufficiently serious to warrant forcible medication
because there was no indication of violence in defendant's past). The particular circumstances of Algere's
offense and his criminal history support the Court's conclusion that the offense is a serious one that the government has an important interest in prosecuting. Algere
was previously convicted for manslaughter, a violent
offense. Previously convicted criminals are prohibited
from possessing guns to reduce the risk to society that
they will engage in violent acts. See US. v. Dillard, 214
F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2000). In light of the risk Algere's
conduct presents to society, particularly considering that
he has committed a violent crime in the past, and the
penalty he faces if convicted, the Court finds that he is
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charged with a serious crime. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that the government has an important interest
in bringing Algere to trial.
The Court must also consider whether special circumstances, such as the potential for a lengthy term of
civil commitment that may result from failure to take
medication voluntarily and the period of confinement for
which the defendant [**13] would be given credit if
convicted, lessen the importance of the government's
interest in this case. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. Civil commitment "may mean lengthy confinement in an institution . .
. that would diminish the risks that ordinarily attach to
freeing without punishment one who has committed a
serious crime." Id. At the hearing, the doctors did not
provide an opinion about whether Algere would be a
prospect for civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 if
he were not medicated, indicating that they would have
to first conduct a risk assessment. n2 Even if Algere were
a prospect for civil commitment, however, the Court
finds that this factor does not completely undermine the
government's strong interest in bringing Algere to trial
on the serious offense with which he has been charged.
See id. ("The potential for future confinement affects, but
does not totally undermine, the strength of the need for
prosecution.").

n2 After a defendant who is judged mentally
incompetent to stand trial has been treated for a
reasonable period of time, the Court may determine that the defendant's mental condition has
not so improved as to permit the trial to proceed.
18 U.S.C. § 4241. In that case, the defendant is
subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4246.
Under that section, if the director of the facility in
which the defendant is hospitalized certifies that
the defendant is suffering from a mental disease
or defect as a result of which his release would
create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, the defendant may be committed to the
custody of the Attorney General. The Attorney
General releases the defendant to the appropriate
official of the State in which the defendant is
domiciled, or, if no State will accept responsibility, to a suitable facility for treatment until (1)
such a State will assume such responsibility; or
(2) the defendant's mental condition is such that
his release, or his conditional release under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment, would not create a
substantial risk of bodily injury to another person
or serious damage to property of another. Id.
s

14]

[*741] As for Algere's period of confinement, he
was arrested on March 25, 2003 and has been confined
about 27 months. The government and the defense agree
that Algere, based on his criminal history and the crime
he committed, faces a likely guideline range of 41 to 51
months if convicted after a trial, or 30 to 37 months if he
pleads guilty and receives a three-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. The Court has not seen a
presentence report to be able to assess conclusively what
Algere's sentence would be under either scenario. Dr.
Zula testified that the proposed treatment regimen would
take at least four months to restore Algere to competency, and defense counsel estimated that he might require an additional month or two at most to prepare the
case for trial, adding approximately six months to Algere's confinement. Although the total length of Algere's
confinement is within counsels' estimated guideline
range for Algere's sentence if he pleads guilty, the likelihood of which is unknown at this time, the Court again
finds that this fact does not completely undermine the
government's interest in prosecuting Algere. See id. Although these special circumstances may lessen [**15]
the government's interest in prosecuting Algere, they do
not override it, particularly considering the serious potential consequences of Algere's crime and his criminal
history. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the government has an important interest in bringing Algere to
trial on the crime with which he is charged.
2. Significantly Furthers the Governments Interest
The second prong of the Sell test requires the Court
to conclude that "involuntary medication will significantly further" the government's interest. 539 U.S. at 181
(emphasis in original). To do so, the Court must find that
administration of the drugs is both "substantially likely to
render the defendant competent to stand trial," and is
"substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant's ability to assist
counsel in conducting a trial defense." Id. Courts have
found that a 70 percent probability is sufficient to find a
substantia] likelihood that an anti-psychotic medication
will restore a defendant to competency, but that a ten
percent probability is not. Gomes, 387 F.3d at 161-62
(70 percent sufficient); [**16] United States v. Morris,
2005 US. Dist. LEXIS 38785 at *13, No. CR.A.95-50SLR, 2005 WL 348306, at *3 (D. Del Feb. 8, 2005)
(same); United States v. Ghane, 392 F.3d 317, 320 (8th
Cir. 2004) (five to ten percent chance of restored competence not a substantial likelihood). To satisfy its burden
on this element, the government must also "set forth the
particular medication, including the dose range, it proposes to administer to [the defendant] to restore his competency." Evans, 404 F.3d at 241. This is required "because Sell requires an evaluation of possible side effects,
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and different atypical antipsychotics will have different
side effect profiles." Id. at 240 (citing Sell, 539 U.S. at
185 ("Whether a particular drug will tend to sedate a
defendant, interfere with communication with counsel,
prevent rapid reaction to trial developments, or diminish
the ability to express emotions are matters important in
determining the permissibility of medication to restore
competence.")). Finally, the government must demonstrate that "the proposed treatment plan, as applied to
this particular defendant, is 'substantially likely' to render the defendant competent [**17] to stand trial and
'substantially unlikely' to produce side effects so significant as to interfere with the defendant's ability to assist
counsel in preparing a defense." Id. at 242 (emphasis in
original); see also United States v. Miller, 292 F. Supp.
2d 163, 164 [*742] (D. Maine 2003) (holding that adequate consideration must be given "to the question of
likely side effects to this Defendant") (emphasis in original).

Psychiatric Association's "Practice Guideline for the
Treatment of Patients with Schizophrenia" [**19] indicates that more than 70 percent of first-episode schizophrenics achieve remission of psychotic signs within
three to four months with antipsychotic medication, and
83 percent achieve stable remission at the end of one
year. (Id. at 4). Medication does not always work, of
course. According to the Guidelines, ten to 30 percent of
patients have little or no response to antipsychotic medication. (Id.). Dr. Zula admitted that males are generally
less responsive to treatment and that Algere's resistance
to being medicated might affect his treatment response,
but she also noted that the New York study and the
FMC's success rate are all based on the administration of
antipsychotic medicine to men. Based on the data and
her own successful experiences, Dr. Zula maintained her
opinion that treatment with antipsychotic medication
generally and Haldol specifically is substantially likely to
restore Algere to trial competence.

Here, the government has set forth a proposed
course of forcible treatment with injectable short-acting
Haldol, a first-generation antipsychotic medication, at a
dose of 5-10 mg per day. (Forensic Addendum of
6/10/05 at 15). Although the doctors' treatment preference is to administer Abilify, a second-generation antipsychotic medicine, at an initial dose of 20-25 mg per day,
Abilify is not available in injectable form and therefore
cannot be administered involuntarily. (Id.). The dose of
Haldol would be started at the low end of the range and
gradually increased to the target range to minimize the
chance that side effects will emerge. (Id.). Any side effects would be detected and managed through monitoring, adjustment of the dosage, [**18] switching medications, or adding a medication to reduce the side effects.
(Id. at 10, 12).

In addition, the doctors opined, based on published
studies that antipsychotic medications can reduce apathy,
improve cognition and improve a patient's insight into
the fact that he is suffering from a psychotic illness, all
of which are relevant to the restoration [**20] of competency. (Forensic Addendum at 7-8). Further, Dr. Zula
testified that even if the antipsychotic medication only
partially treated Algere's psychotic symptoms, that
treatment would give Algere a better chance of overcoming barriers to improving his mental condition. For these
reasons, the Court [*743] finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the government's proposed treatment plan
is substantially likely to restore Algere to trial competence.

a. Substantially Likely to Render Defendant
Competent to Stand Trial
Algere's doctors testified that treatment with antipsychotic medication such as Haldol is the primary treatment for Algere's particular condition and is substantially
likely to restore Algere to competence. Dr. Zula's opinion regarding the chances of restoring Algere to competence with medication is based on three sources. First,
Dr. Zula cited her experience with medicating patients
involuntarily at the FMC, many of them schizophrenic,
which has a 70-80% success rate of restoring them to
trial competence. Second, Dr. Zula referred to a study of
involuntarily medicated felony defendants in New York,
most of whom had schizophrenia, which found that 93
percent of those medicated had an unequivocally good
response to the medication and that 87 percent were restored to competency, often with first generation antipsychotics such as Haldol. (See Literature Review, revised
6/20/05 at 2). Finally, Dr. Zula noted that the American

b. Substantially Unlikely to Have Side Effects
that Will Interfere Significantly with Ability to Assist
Counsel in Conducting a Trial Defense
As for side effects from antipsychotic medication
that might interfere with Algere's ability to assist counsel
in his defense, the evidence indicates that such effects
vary widely. n3 (Id. at 8). Dr. Zula testified that common
side effects from Haldol, the medication the government
proposes to administer to Algere involuntarily, may include the following.

n3 Once Algere's mental state is stabilized,
the doctors opine that the dosage of any antipyschotic medication can be lowered to the minimum dose required to maintain his mental stability, which will minimize the risk of side effects.
(Id. at 12). They also point out that Algere's anxiety may be reduced after his legal proceedings
are over, which would also allow for a reduction
in the dosage. (Id.). These considerations regard-
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ing what might happen in the future, however, are
not relevant to the present purpose of determining
whether the medication is currently appropriate
for the purpose of restoring Algere's competence
to stand trial.
[**21]
Sedation Side Effects
Some amount of sedation is likely to be a side-effect
of Haldol, along with all other antipsychotic medications,
but Dr. Zula testified that the effects are not that severe
and are substantially unlikely to interfere with Algere's
function and ability to assist counsel. Dr. Zula also testified that sedation effects are greatest in patients who
already present apathy as a symptom of their psychosis.
Because Algere has a "full affect" without apathy as a
symptom, he is substantially unlikely to experience sedation side-effects that will interfere significantly with his
ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial defense. The
doctors indicated that they will monitor for sedation sideeffects and exercise good clinical practice, including
changing medication, if sedation effects appear. (Id. at
8).
Abnormal Movement Side Effects
The next group of possible short-term side effects
are abnormal movements. Movement-related side effects
may include stiffness and tremor, dystonic reactions, and
akathisia. All first-generation antipsychotics, including
Haldol, are associated with short-term movement sideeffects, while second-generation [**22] antipsychotics
are less associated with such effects and generally only at
higher doses. (Id.). These side effects are generally managed by reducing the dose or, if reducing the dose would
render the antipsychotic property of the drug ineffective,
another medication is prescribed to control the effects or
the antipsychotic medication is changed. (Id. at 8-10).
Dr. Zula testified that stiffness, tremor and masklike facial expression, which occurs in 15 to 50 percent
of individuals treated with first-generation antipsychotics, can be minimized easily through dose reduction. (Literature Review at 13). If not, benztropine or
diphenhydramine are prescribed to relieve these symptoms. (Forensic Addendum at 10). Acute dystonia, which
typically manifests as a muscle spasm in up to 10 percent
of patients treated with first-generation antipsychotic
medication, is easily and effectively relieved by administering an anticholinergic medication. (Literature Review
at 14). Akathisia, an uncomfortable restlessness or tension that may produce objective signs of restlessness,
occurs in 20 to 30 percent of individuals treated with
first-generation [*744] antipsychotics and is treated by

reducing the [**23] dose of the antipsychotic, switching
medications or prescribing an additional medication. (Id.
at 13). Tardive dyskinesia, the manifestation of writhing
movements of muscles in the fingers, hands, arms, lower
extremities, or face and tongue, is a side-effect of long
term use of first-generation antipsychotic medications at
a rate of approximately five percent per year after one
year of use, with 60 to 70 percent of the cases described
as mild and three to 10 percent described as severe. (Id.
at 14; Forensic Addendum at 12). Tardive dyskinesia
does not interfere with cognition, but more severe cases
might be noticeable in a court proceeding. There is a
lower risk for development of the disorder, however, in
patients Algere's age. (Id. at 16). Dr. Zula also testified
that during trial, these kinds of movement side effects
could be managed with the administration of another
medication and, in her opinion, they are substantially
unlikely to interfere significantly with Algere's ability to
assist his counsel in conducting a trial defense.
Endocrinological Side Effects
The final group of potential side effects are endocrinologic side effects. Most first-generation [**24] and
some second-generation antipsychotics can cause elevated prolactin levels, which may affect the regulation of
other hormones and manifest in 25 to 50 percent of men
as erectile dysfunction. (Forensic Addendum at 12). The
elevated levels "frequently" return to normal when the
medication dose is decreased or when a different medication is prescribed. (Id.).
The metabolic syndrome is another recognized side
effect of second-generation antipsychotic medications
and can cause "elevations in weight, blood pressure,
blood sugar and cholesterol. (Id. at 12). This side effect
is detected through a mandatory metabolic monitoring
program at the FMC that includes monitoring weight,
blood pressure, and serum lipid and glucose levels and
also involves dietary and exercise educational classes.
(Id. at 13). If the metabolic syndrome occurs, appropriate
intervention is prescribed, such as dietary changes, recommended exercise, medications for high blood pressure
or cholesterol, or a change in antipsychotic medication.
(Id.). The doctors point out that these endrocrinologic
side effects are not the kind of effects that would interfere with Algere's ability to assist counsel in his [**25]
defense.
Finally, rare and unpredictable reactions to medication are always possible. (Id. at 11). For example, neuroleptic malignant syndrome, cause by blood pressure instability and the breakdown of tissue toxic to kidneys,
may be fatal. However, it is rare and can be treated by
stopping the administration of antipsychotic medication
and taking supportive measures. (Id.). Medical allergies
are also possible, but Dr. Zula testified that the medica-
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tion will first be administered in a small test dose to reduce the severity of any potential reaction.
The Court finds that the doctors have carefully considered the benefits and risks for Mr. Algere's proposed
treatment and that the proposed treatment with antipsychotic medication is substantially likely to restore Mr.
Algere's competency to stand trial and substantially
unlikely to produce side effects that will interfere significantly with his ability to aid in his defense.
3. No Less Intrusive Means
The third prong of the Sell test requires the Court to
conclude that involuntary medication is necessary to
further the government's interests by finding "that any
alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to
[**26] achieve substantially the same results." Sell, 539
U.S. at 181. Here, the evidence in the [*745] record
indicates that no less intrusive treatments are likely to
achieve substantially the same results. Both doctors testified that the chances are very slim that Algere will become competent to stand trial without taking antipsychotic medication, because their experience indicates that
restoration of competency rarely happens without the
administration of antipsychotic medication. The doctors
noted that Algere has been at the FMC for more than
twelve months without significant change in his condition. (Id. at 13-14). Dr. Zula testified that alternatives
such as cognitive behavioral therapy are unlikely to help
Algere because a patient has to be receptive to that kind
of therapy for it to be effective, and Algere is unwilling
to re-examine his delusions. In addition, the doctors have
tried and have been unable to engage Algere in these
kinds of therapies. The Court therefore finds that less
intrusive means are unlikely to achieve substantially the
same results as the administration of antipsychotic medication.
The Court is also required to consider whether the
less intrusive [**27] means of ordering Algere to undergo the treatment, on pain of contempt, might achieve
the same result. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. Considering that
Algere remains incompetent, continues to refuse all
medication and has indicated that he thinks the Court is
part of a conspiracy against him, a Court order threatening contempt would be unlikely to affect Algere's willingness to take the medication. See Gomes, 387 F.3d at
163 (finding that, because defendant repeatedly refused
all chemical treatment and appeared to believe that the
judiciary was enlisted in a conspiracy against him, a
court order was not likely to achieve the same results as
forcible medication); Morris, 2005 US. Dist. LEXIS
38785, 2005 WL 348306, at *J (finding that, as defendant was unable to understand his legal situation, a contempt order would be worthless). The Court will nevertheless order that medical personnel treating Algere re-

quest that Algere voluntarily take antipsychotic medication by oral method before any medication is administered involuntarily. The Court concludes that involuntary
medication is necessary to further the government's interest because it finds that less alternative treatments
[**28] are unlikely to achieve substantially the same
results.
4. Medical Appropriateness
The fourth prong of the Sell test requires the Court
to "conclude that administration of the drugs is medically
appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical interest in
light of his medical condition." 539 U.S. at 181. The
government must demonstrate that the particular defendant's individual mental and physical condition have
been considered in evaluating the proposed course of
treatment and concluding that it is medically appropriate.
Evans, 404 F.3d at 240-41. To do so, the government
must:

spell out why it proposed (he particular
treatment, . . . provide the estimated time
the proposed treatment plan will take to
restore the defendant's competence and
the criteria it will apply when deciding
when to discontinue the treatment, describe the plan's probable benefits and
side effect risks for the defendant's particular medical condition,. . . show how it
will deal with the plan's probable side effects, and explain why, in its view, the
benefits of the treatment plan outweigh
the costs of its side effects.

Evans, 404 F.3d at 242. [**29]
Most of these criteria have already been addressed,
and the Court finds that the proposed treatment in this
case is medically appropriate for Algere. Antipsychotic
medication is the standard treatment [*746] for Algere's
condition, whether inside or outside of an institution like
the FMC. (Forensic Addendum of 6/10/05 at 14). Left
unmedicated, Algere is subject to adverse consequences,
including increased risk of suicide and increased risk of
death from natural causes. (Id. at 6). Untreated psychosis
may even result in permanent damage to a person's brain
function. (Id. at 7). The proposed treatment has numerous potential positive effects and is expected to significantly improve Algere's quality of life. The doctors testified that Algere lives in a state of constant fear and anxiety, convinced that others are constantly plotting against
him, and they are unable to convince him otherwise. The
proposed treatment is likely to relieve Algere of these
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fears and thereby reduce his anxiety and stress. It is also
expected to improve Algere's insight into his illness,
which may result in his acceptance of medication voluntarily. Indeed, the doctors testified that the proposed
treatment is [**30] necessary to alleviate Algere's suffering and is his only chance to function as an independent member of society. Further, they are unaware of any
medical condition Algere has that would be worsened by
the administration of the medication or of any other condition that could explain his psychotic symptoms. (Id. at
14-15). Any side-effects will be managed as described,
and Algere will be placed on the metabolic monitoring
protocol to detect any endocrinologic side-effects that
may emerge. (Id.).
The evidence indicates that the doctors have considered the benefits and potential side effects and concluded
that treatment with antipsychotic medication is appropriate for Algere. The treatment will involve a careful oversight by a psychiatrist, who will prescribe medication at
an appropriate dosage and monitor Algere for both
therapeutic and side effects of the treatment. Based on
the June 10, 2005, report and the testimony of Drs. Pyant
and Zula, the Court concludes that the proposed administration of anti-psychotic medication is justified because
the government has established by clear and convincing
evidence that it is medically appropriate, is substantially
unlikely to have side [**31] effects, and, taking account
of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary to further the
important governmental interest of rendering Algere
competent to stand trial for a serious offense.
III. CONCLUSION
Having considered the Sell factors and Algere's current lack of competence to stand trial, the Court continues Algere's commitment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
4241(d)(2)(A) and GRANTS the government's motion to

have Algere medicated involuntarily to render him competent to stand trial, under the following conditions.
FMC personnel must provide Algere with a copy of this
Order and Reasons, explain to him the potential side effects of Ability, and advise him that Ability must be
taken orally at appropriate intervals. They must also explain the potential side effects of Haldol and advise Algere that Haldol is administered by injection at appropriate intervals if he refuses to take Ability orally. All
medical personnel treating Algere shall request that
Algere voluntarily take medication orally before each
and every administration of medication by injection.
If Algere does not agree to take Ability orally within ten
days of the date of this Order, [**32] FMC personnel
are authorized to administer Haldol by injection over
Algere's objection.
Algere shall be confined at the FMC for four
months, or a lesser period if reasonably sufficient to restore him to competency. At the end of four months, or
when Algere's competency is restored if that occurs in
less than four months, a report shall be filed with the
Court detailing the [*747] results of the treatment. The
report must set forth the criteria that are used to determine whether Algere has been restored to competence to
stand trial and the result of the application of those criteria to Algere's case. If the doctors conclude that Algere
has been restored to competence to stand trial, they must
also set forth what side effects Algere has experienced on
the medication and how the medication will affect Algere at trial.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 1st day of July, 2005.
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Appeal from the United
States District Court for the District of Wyoming. (D.C.
No. 03-CR-102-D).*
* After examining the briefs and appellate record,
this panel has determined unanimously that oral
argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See FED. R. APP. P.
34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

COUNSEL: David A. Kubichek, Assistant United States
Attorney, (Matthew H. Mead, United States Attorney,
with him on the brief), Casper, Wyoming, for PlaintiffAppeUee.
Ronald G. Pretty, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for DefendantAppellant.
JUDGES: Before SEYMOUR, LUCERO and O'BRIEN,
Circuit Judges.
OPINION BY: O'BRIEN
OPINION: [*1109] O'BRIEN, Circuit Judge.
Steven Paul Bradley (Bradley) was found incompetent to stand trial. Physicians at a government medical
facility, however, concluded Bradley's competency to
stand trial could be restored through treatment with antipsychotic drugs. After Bradley's repeated refusal to take
such medication, the district court, pursuant to the standards set forth in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 156
L. Ed. 2d 197, 123 S Ct. 2174 (2003), [**2] ordered
Bradley to be involuntarily medicated in order to render
him competent to stand trial. Bradley appeals this order.
Exercising jurisdiction under the collateral order excep-

tion nl to the final order rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.

nl [A] preliminary or interim decision is appealable as a collateral order when it (1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Sell, 539 US. at 176 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). An order to involuntarily medicate falls within the collateral order
exception. Id.
[*1110] I. Background
On January 31, 2003, Bradley was charged by
criminal complaint with violating 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). til
The complaint alleged that on the previous day, while
riding a motorcycle, Bradley lobbed a hand grenade at a
group of salesmen gathered in the [**3] parking lot of
Cowboy Dodge, a vehicle dealership in Cheyenne,
Wyoming, because he was dissatisfied with the purchase
of a truck from the dealership. Attached to the grenade
was a note which read "I want my $ 26,000.00." In an
interview with law enforcement, Bradley admitted to the
incident and also indicated he possessed explosives, explosive devices and a firearm at his home because he
believed someone was trying to kill him. Bradley was
subsequently indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). n3 Later still, he was charged by criminal
complaint with violating 18 U.S.C. § § 1951(a) n4 and
924(c)(l)(B)(ii). n5

n2 "Whoever maliciously . . . attempts to
damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building . . . used in interstate . . . commerce or in any activity affecting interstate . . .

Page 2
417 F.3d 1107, *; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15477, **

commerce shall be imprisoned for not less than 5
years and not more than 20 years . . . ." 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(0.
n3 "It shall be unlawful for any person- (1)
who has been convicted in any court of, [sic] a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year .. . to .. . possess in or affecting
commerce, a n y . . . ammunition . . . . " 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). The penalty includes imprisonment for
not more than ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
Bradley had a prior federal conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
r**4]

n4 "Whoever in any way or degree obstructs,
delays, or affects commerce or the movement of
any article or commodity in commerce, by . . .
extortion or attempts . . . so to do . . . shall be . . .
imprisoned not more than twenty years . . . . " 18
U.S.C. § 1951(a).
n5 "Any person who, during and in relation
to any crime of violence . . . for which the person
may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
uses or carries a firearm [destructive device] . . .
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
not less than 30 years." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A),
(B)(ii).
On February 5, Bradley moved inter alia for a determination of competency to stand trial. On February
19, the court granted the motion. See 18 U.S.C §
4241(a). It ordered Bradley committed for a psychiatric
or psychological examination, with report of the results
to be submitted to the court. See 18 U.S.C § 4241(b).
See also 18 U.S.C. § 4247(c) (stating requirements for
report). On June 19, [**5] with the report in hand, the
court conducted a competency hearing. The report, authored by Dr. Richard L. DeMier, Ph.D., n6 diagnosed
Bradley with a psychotic mental illness (paranoid
schizophrenia), averred he was not a danger to himself or
others within the facility, concluded he lacked competency to proceed to trial, n7 and stated Bradley's prognosis was fair:

[Bradley] has no appreciable insight into
the nature or ramifications of [his] disorder, and he may be resistant to treatment.
Nevertheless, psychiatric medications are
generally able to effectively treat symp-

toms such as those displayed by the defendant. It is possible that an extended period of mental health treatment [*1111]
in an inpatient setting would be sufficient
to restore his competency. He might well
exhibit a therapeutic response to a regimen of psychiatric medications during
such a period of hospitalization. Although
a positive treatment response cannot be
guaranteed, it is a reasonable expectation
that Mr. Bradley could be restored to
competency following a period of treatment in a structured setting, which included a regimen of psychiatric medications . . . .

(Appellee App. at 30.) On June 19, the [**6] court, on
the basis of the report, found Bradley lacked competency
to proceed to trial. It ordered him recommitted for treatment and further evaluation to ascertain the likelihood he
would regain competence within the foreseeable future.
See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).
n6 Dr. DeMier is a clinical psychologist attached to the United States Medical Center for
Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri.
n7 "Although Mr. Bradley is able to demonstrate a sound understanding of legal processes in
the abstract, his psychotic mental illness prevents
him from applying that information to his own
case in a rational manner." (Appellee App. at 29.)
Three days before the competency hearing, the Supreme Court decided Sell, in which it held:

the Constitution permits the Government
involuntarily to administer antipsychotic
drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing
serious criminal charges in order to render
that defendant competent to stand trial,
but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, [**7] is substantially unlikely
to have side effects that may undermine
the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important
governmental trial-related interests.
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Sell 539 U.S. at 179. With this in mind, the court ordered that Bradley's further evaluation include an "assessment of the relevant factors" stated in Sell for the
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to
assist Bradley's return to competence. n8 (Id. at 35.)
n8 The court reserved for itself the legal
question whether or not involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to Bradley would
"further important governmental trial-related interests." Sell 539 U.S. at 179. (Appellee App. at
16.)
Pursuant to the court's instruction, Dr. DeMier conducted his follow-up assessment with the following questions in mind:

1. Would Mr. Bradley benefit from treatment with psychiatric medications?
2. Can Mr. Bradley [**8] be persuaded,
in consultation with his clinicians, to voluntarily submit to treatment with psychiatric medications?
3. If Mr. Bradley is unwilling to voluntarily submit to treatment with psychiatric
medications, would that treatment nevertheless be considered medically appropriate?
4. Would the administration of psychiatric
medications have unfavorable side effects
which would be substantially likely to undermine the fairness of any trial which
might occur in this case?
5. Is treatment with psychiatric medication likely to return Mr. Bradley to a
status in which he can substantially assist
his attorney in his defense?

(Mat 37.)
In his report, dated August 22, Dr. DeMier again diagnosed Bradley with a psychotic mental illness (paranoid schizophrenia), averred he was not a danger to himself or others within the facility, and concluded he was
mcompetent to proceed to trial. He answered the questions posed in the court's order as follows:

1. "The treatment of choice for a psychotic disorder is antipsychotic medication. Indeed, antipsychotic medication is
essential to the effective treatment of psychotic disorders. . . . Other forms of
treatment, [**9] [*1112] including education, psychotherapy, and behavioral interventions, do not address the essence of
the disorder and are unlikely to be successful."
2. Bradley was unwilling to voluntarily
submit to treatment with psychiatric
medications.
3. "Because treatment with psychiatric
medications is the intervention of choice
for Mr. Bradley's condition, it is my opinion, as well as the opinion of the psychiatry staff at this facility, that treatment of
his illness with psychiatric medications is
medically appropriate."
4. The most common side effects of antipsychotic medications are best characterized as nuisance side effects, as their appearance does not entail the risk of serious
harm, but only inconvenience or discomfort . . . . More serious side effects are far
less common . . . . The vast majority of
patients report no serious side effects, and
nuisance side effects can be effectively
addressed. Some patients report no side
effects whatsoever. Especially with the
advent of a newer class of "atypical" antipsychotic medications, the appearance of
severe side effects is becoming increasingly rare.
The therapeutic effect [of] antipsychotic
medication is to improve thinking. [**10]
Individuals with psychotic disorders typically have severe impairment in both the
form and content of their thoughts. This
may include disorganized thoughts, sensory distortions (such as hallucinations),
disturbances of emotion, and impairments
in the ability to think in a rational or sequential manner. Treatment of these impairments is likely to enhance, rather than
undermine, the fairness of any legal proceeding in which the patient is a participant.
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5. It is a reasonable expectation, based on
the current scientific knowledge in psychiatry and on experiences with many individuals with similar disorders, that Mr.
Bradley could be restored to competency
following a period of treatment in a structured setting, which included a regimen of
psychiatric medications.

drug will issue from this Court
within ten days from today.

The only order that will issue
from this Court today, Mr. Bradley, is that you again consult with
your lawyer privately regarding
these issues and thereafter voluntarily submit to the administration
of these drugs. The Court orders
you to do that and in doing so intends to exercise its full civil contempt powers.

(Id. at 41-43.)
On November 3, the court conducted another competency hearing. Dr. DeMier testified that Bradley's condition had not changed since the assessment contained in
his August 22 report. 'The only additional information
that's not in the report again has to do with Mr. Bradley's
stance since the report was prepared in that he is becoming more and more insistent that he has no mental illness
and has [**11] voiced strong opposition to taking medication." n9 (Appellee App. at 58.) The court again found
Bradley incompetent to proceed to trial. It adopted Dr.
DeMier's findings, addressed each of the Sell factors and
ordered Bradley to consult with counsel with an eye to
voluntarily submitting to the medication. If he did not
voluntarily submit with ten days, the court indicated it
would enter an order for involuntary administration of
the medication. nlO This it did on November 13, 2003:

(Appellant's App. at 98.)
The minute entry in the court's docket characterizes the November 3, 2003 order as follows:
"Court finds defendant will benefit from antipsychotic medication and orders if the defendant will
not voluntarily take medication the Court will
find him in civil contempt and order the involuntary administration of medication." (Appellee's
App. at 104.)
n i l The court's order is no less one for the
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication because its means of enforcement is
through the exercise of the contempt power of the
court rather than by forcible medication. See Sell,
539 U.S. at 181 ("The court must consider less
intrusive means for administering the drugs, e.g.,
a court order to the defendant backed by the contempt power, before considering more intrusive
methods."). The hallmark of an order for the involuntary administration of medication is that it
breaches the defendant's will. See id. at 171 ("The
staff sought permission to administer the medication against Sell's will. That effort is the subject
of the present proceedings.") (emphasis added). A
defendant who is unwilling to voluntarily take
medication, which fairly describes Bradley, is no
less overcome by a threat to be found in contempt
than he or she is by being forcibly medicated.

[•1113] ORDERED that Defendant, after further consultation with his attorney
and the mental health professionals at the
U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners
in Springfield, Missouri, shall submit to
the administration of medication which
the Court finds is medically appropriate
and necessary to render Defendant competent to stand trial. If Defendant refuses
to comply with the Court's order, he will
be found in civil contempt.

(Appellant App. at 107.) nl 1 Bradley appeals.
n9 Bradley himself testified he would refuse
to voluntarily take antipsychotic medications; it
was his belief they were not medically indicated.
[**12]

[**13]
17. Standard of Proof & Standard of Review

nlO The district court stated:
An appropriate order compelling [the] administration of this

The Supreme Court in Sell articulated neither a standard of proof for the Sell factors nor a standard of appellate review. In deciding these standards, we bear in mind
that involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications implicates a constitutional right. "An individual has
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a constitutionally protected liberty interest [under the
Due Process Clause] in avoiding involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs-an interest that only an essential or overriding state interest might overcome." Sell,
539 U.S. at 178-79 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The standards we set must weigh this vital constitutional interest in the balance.
To date, only one circuit has decided the standard of
proof and the standard for appellate review of the Sell
factors. The Second Circuit first parsed the Sell factors
into factual and legal questions. It decided "whether the
Government's asserted interest is important is a legal
question." United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160
(2d Cir. 2004), cert, denied, 160 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 125 S.
Ct. 1094 (2005). We agree, [**14] with one qualification. We would expand the parameters of the legal question to include whether involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs "is necessary significantly to further
important governmental trial-related interests." Sell, 539
U.S. at 179. In other words, "has the Government, in
light of the efficacy, the side effects, the possible alternatives, and the medical appropriateness of a particular
course of antipsychotic drug treatment, shown a need for
that treatment sufficiently important to overcome the
individual's protected interest in refusing it?" Id. at
[*1114] 183. nl2 The Second Circuit determined the
remaining Sell factors depend upon factual findings and
ought to be proved by the government by clear and convincing evidence. Gomes, 387 F.3d at 160. Recognizing
the vital constitutional liberty interest at stake, we agree.
We review conclusions of law de novo and findings of
fact for clear error. Stillwater Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
CIT Group/Equipment Finan. Inc., 383 F.3d 1148, 1150
(10th Cir. 2004).

est in refusing unwanted medication.

[**15]
III. Discussion
The question whether a district court has followed
the correct procedures under Sell for involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to a non-dangerous
criminal defendant for the purpose of rendering him
competent to stand trial nl3 is one of first impression in
this circuit. We first observe the predicate for the Sell
factors is clearly established by the record. There is no
dispute Bradley is mentally ill. Nor is it contested he
faces serious criminal charges (the three pending criminal charges against him permit imprisonment for a total
of 50 years). We now take up the propriety of the court's
order with respect to the Sell factors ad seriatim.

nl3 In Sell, the Supreme Court stated that it
was not necessary for a court to satisfy the standards for involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs in order to render a defendant competent to stand trial if there was an independent
and sufficient basis to otherwise order their administration, such as where the defendant is dangerous or where withholding of the drugs would
endanger his or her health. Sell, 539 U.S. at 18183. The record in this case provides no basis for
an order for involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs on the basis of dangerousness or
threat to health.
[**16]

nl2 See also United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d
560, 568 (8th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted), vacated by 539 U.S. 166, 156 L. Ed. 2d 197, 123 S.
Ct. 2174(2003).

The first question, therefore, is
whether the district court erred by
holding that the government's interest in bringing Sell to trial is
sufficient to outweigh Sell's interest in refusing medication. This is
a mixed question of law and fact,
so we review the district court's
finding de novo. To make this determination, we must weigh the
government's interest in rendering
Sell competent against Sell's inter-

We turn first to the factual findings. Sell directs the
court to determine whether or not administration of antipsychotic medication is medically appropriate, "i.e., in
the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical
condition. The specific kinds of drugs at issue may matter here as elsewhere. Different kinds of antipsychotic
drugs may produce different side effects and enjoy different levels of success." Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. This necessarily includes a determination that administration of
the drug regimen is "substantially likely to render the
defendant competent to stand trial." Id.
Dr. DeMier characterized administration of antipsychotic medication in general as "the treatment of choice
for a psychotic disorder" and superior to nonpharmaceutical interventions. (Appellee App. at 41.) He
indicated that while some patients may suffer side effects
from administration of antipsychotic medications, these
are typically of the nuisance variety and able to be effec-
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tively treated. He added that "use of the newer 'atypical'
antipsychotic medications has largely eliminated the necessity to prescribe a second medication to alleviate side
effects. [**17] " {Id. at 42.) Also, with the newer drugs,
"severe side effects [are] becoming increasingly rare."
{Id.) He cautioned that "because individuals vary greatly
in their therapeutic responses to psychiatric medications,
and in their susceptibility to side effects, it is important
[*1115] to continue to monitor them regularly." {Id. at
43.) Most significant, in our view, was Dr. DeMier's observation that "individuals with psychotic disorders typically have severe impairment in both the form and content of their thoughts[,]" and "the therapeutic effect [of]
antipsychotic medication is to improve thinking." {Id.) In
his opinion,

[a] course of inpatient mental health
treatment which includes the administration of psychiatric medications is usually
sufficient to restore a defendant to competency. It is the experience of the clinicians
at this facility that more than 80% of defendants committed for competency restoration treatment are later deemed competent by the trier of fact.

{Id.) He was guardedly optimistic that administration of
antipsychotic medication would materially aid in restoring Bradley to competency. Based on Dr. DeMier's report and testimony, [**18] the district court found that
Bradley would

substantially benefit from the administration of psychiatric medications . . . and
that the therapeutic effect of these antipsychotic medications far outweigh any potential negative side effects to their administration and that, in any event, there
are appropriate mechanisms available to
monitor the defendant's administration of
these drugs to ensure that he does not suffer from some adverse consequence of
these drugs.

{Id. at 83-84.)
The excerpted record admits of little challenge to the
proposition that administration of antipsychotic drugs
would substantially aid Bradley's return to competency.
We conclude the Government met its burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that such a

regimen was medically appropriate, and the district court
did not clearly err in so finding.
Next, Sell directs an inquiry into whether "administration of the drugs is substantially unlikely to have side
effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant's ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial defense, thereby rendering the trial unfair." Id. Dr. DeMier
initially reported that while Bradley had [**19] a "sound
understanding of legal processes in the abstract, his psychotic mental illness prevents him from applying that
information to his own case in a rational manner." (Appellee App. at 29.) He later added that "treatment of [his]
impairments [with antipsychotic drugs] is likely to enhance, rather than undermine, the fairness of any legal
proceeding in which the patient is a participant." {Id. at
43.) The court so found. The record is bereft of any challenge to this proposition. It is patent from the evidence.
Therefore, the court did not clearly err in its finding.
Finally, "the court must find that any alternative, less
intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially
the same results. And the court must consider less intrusive means for administering the drugs, e.g., a court order to the defendant backed by the contempt power, before considering more intrusive methods." Id. at 181 (citations omitted). As earlier noted, Dr. DeMier reported
that an antipsychotic drug regimen was the treatment of
choice for psychosis and far superior to nonpharmaceutical interventions. There is nothing in the
record to rebut this proposition. To the end, the court
tried [**20] to induce Bradley to voluntarily consent to
the drug therapy. Even as it entered its order for involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs, the court ordered Dr. DeMier and Bradley's counsel to separately
confer with Bradley on the advantage of voluntarily
submitting to treatment.
[*1116] Furthermore, the court considered and ordered a less intrusive means of implementing its order
for involuntary drug therapy. If Bradley continued to
refuse to lake the drugs, the consequence was not that he
would be forcibly medicated against his will, but that he
would have to answer to the court for his refusal. This is
a measured and appropriate response by the district judge
to the circumstances presented. Therefore, we conclude
the Government met its burden in establishing by clear
and convincing evidence that less intrusive treatments
were "unlikely to achieve substantially the same results,"
id., as drug therapy, and the court did not err in so finding.
We now turn to the court's legal conclusions. Sell
first requires a legal determination whether "important
governmental [trial-related] interests are at stake." Id. at
180. The district court concluded in the affirmative.
[**21] Sell elaborates on this requirement. It does so in
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the context of well-settled law that considers the Government's interest in bringing a criminal defendant to
trial to be fundamental. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337, 347, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 90 S. Ct. 1057 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (The "constitutional power to bring
an accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of 'ordered
liberty' and prerequisite to social justice and peace.").
However, while "the Government's interest in bringing to
trial an individual accused of a serious crime is important
. . . courts must consider the facts of the individual case
in evaluating the Government's interest in prosecution.
Special circumstances may lessen the importance of that
interest." Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
The Court offered two examples of special circumstances. In the first, a defendant, in the absence of courtordered administration of psychiatric medication, might
suffer lengthy civil commitment for mental illness "that
would diminish the risks that ordinarily attach to freeing
without punishment one who has committed a serious
crime." Id. In the second, a defendant may have already
been confined [**22] for a lengthy period of time pending a determination of competency, confinement for
which he or she would receive credit against any sentence ultimately imposed. Id. As we read Sell, this latter
example suggests that when the amount of time the defendant is confined pending determination of competency is in parity with an expected sentence in the criminal proceeding, the Government may no longer be able
to claim an important interest in prosecution.
Neither example applies here. The federal civil
commitment statute requires a showing that the proposed
patient presents "a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another person or serious damage to property of another^]" 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). The State of Wyoming,
where Bradley is domiciled, requires proof of mental
illness for civil commitment, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2510-110(j), with mental illness defined as "a physical,
emotional, mental or behavioral disorder which causes a
person to be dangerous to himself or others and which
requires treatment[.]" WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10101(a)(ix). Dr. DeMier reported Bradley presented no
threat to himself [**23] or others within the facility
where he was held. nl4 He testified he did not evaluate
for risk to persons or property outside of the facility. In
all, the record does not support [*1117] the proposition
that Bradley would be a candidate for civil commitment.
nl5

nl4 "His behavior has been cordial, cooperative, and he's exhibited no behaviors at this facility that have caused us any concern for our safety
or the safety of other people around Mr. Bradley
within this setting." (Appellee App. at 57.)

nl5 We hasten to add, as the District of Columbia Circuit has noted, that while civil commitment might reduce the danger to the community posed by an individual,

the civil commitment argument
assumes that the government's essential penological interests lie
only in incapacitating dangerous
offenders. It ignores the retributive, deterrent, communicative,
and investigative functions of the
criminal justice system, which
serve to ensure that offenders receive their just deserts, to make
clear that offenses entail consequences, and to discover what
happened through the public
mechanism of trial.

United States v. Weston, 347 U.S. App. B.C. 145,
255 F.3d873, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
[**24]
Nor does the second example apply. Less than nine
months elapsed between Bradley's commitment for competency examination and the court's order for involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs. This span of time
pales in comparison to the fifty years imprisonment
Bradley faces if convicted of the charges against him.
Without an order for the involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs, and with Bradley's continuing refusal to voluntarily accept such drug therapy, the additional length of time Bradley could be held pending
competency determination is limited. See 18 U.S.C. §
4241(d).
Apart from these failed examples, we can identify
no other special circumstances tending to diminish the
importance of the Government's interest in restoring
Bradley to competence so that he may face trial. Therefore, we find no error in the court's legal conclusion that
important Government interests are at stake in restoring
Bradley to competency.
Finally, we reach the ultimate legal question whether
involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs "is
necessary significantly to further," Sell, 539 U.S. at 179,
the important governmental trial-related [**25] interests
in returning Bradley to competency. Here, the court's
factual findings come into play. Without any one of these
findings, it is impossible to say that involuntary admini-
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station of antipsychotic drugs would further the Government's interest in restoring Bradley to competency.
See id. at 181. However, with the court having not
clearly erred in making any of its findings, we easily
conclude its order for involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs will significantly further important
governmental trial-related interests. In other words, the
need for treatment with antipsychotic drugs is "suffi-

ciently important to overcome [Bradley's] protected interest in refusing it." Id. at 183.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district
court.

